Teaching and Learning > DISCOURSE

Epictetus Teaching Philosophy

Author: Ioannis S. Christodoulou

Journal Title: Discourse

ISSN: 1741-4164

ISSN-L:

Volume: 5

Number: 1

Start page: 142

End page: 150

Return to vol. 5 no. 1 index page

The great philosophical tradition of ethics is a big challenge for anyone who teaches ethics. A large number of theories are waiting out there to be taught and many, many students are waiting out there to be initiated into a world of fascinating thoughts, of outstanding ideas, which, from their authors' points of view, offer many different approaches to life and living.

So, from the point of view of our students' attitudes towards our lessons, we are obliged to bear in mind that, when we teach ethics, a large number of our students are likely to be impressed, if not by us, then at least by the theories we teach. They look forward to hearing from us things that they have never heard before, ideas that they have never before considered. Of course, we know that some of our students live without such a purpose. They are not so ready to be impressed, but rather we have to provoke their interest, in order to make them motivated to listen to our lessons. I think that this is the point we should start with, because even though we may not believe in any particular ethical theory, even though we see all ethical theories with a critical eye and even though we might not even believe in ethical theorising itself, the fact is that we have to give our students the opportunity to decide for themselves.

Thus, in this paper, I intend to explore the non-transparent dynamics of the academic teaching of ethics. What is implied in the relation between the instructor of ethics and his students? Are there any limits to academic objectivity when we teach ethics? In short, I am interested in the many dimensions in the teaching of ethics, besides the strictly academic ones. In order to explore what the possible implications are, I will examine the characteristics which were inherent in the way the teaching of ethics was conducted in ancient times. Do we have the feeling, like instructors of ethics in ancient times had, that we can change the psychological state of our students, that we can change their lives, that they profit from our teaching in a way that goes beyond simply assimilating knowledge of philosophical theories? Do our students evaluate our lessons? What exactly do they evaluate?

In an attempt to answer some of these questions, I have chosen to examine, in the form of a case study, the teaching of the stoic Epictetus. I consider Epictetus to be the most typical example of an instructor of ethics. He fulfils all the standards of academic teaching, but he simultaneously wants to change the lives of his listeners. Did he achieve such a thing? Is there a way to make ethics more interesting for those who study philosophy? What is implied in philosophical 'learning'? Can it change our students' ways of behaving and acting? What are the presuppositions for such radical change?

In Epictetus' era, philosophers claimed that they were able to cure human souls. Philosophy was considered to be a kind of medicine. Such were the times of imperial (Roman) stoicism. The stoic philosopher Epictetus is one of the characteristic representatives of the attitude in question. In his Discourses, he lays out his ethical principles. He discusses with his students. He formulates arguments in order to prove the truth of his philosophy. He expected that his speeches would become a cure for the passions of his students' souls. He expected that his words would contribute to the moral improvement of his listeners.

Nevertheless, throughout the whole history of philosophy, the teaching of a 'philosophy of life' has constituted a philosophical conundrum. The formulation of the notions of a philosophy of life constitutes a philosophical problem. How could we reform a life with catholic principles, which probably encapsulate only some aspects of life? Could such principles constitute some regulatory rules for life, given that there are a lot of unpredictable circumstances? Is it possible, moreover, to transmit to the students of our subject the notions of a philosophical 'behaviour', since these notions are derived from personal philosophical insights, which probably could be effectual only for the person who believes in them? Is it possible to teach such insights? I believe that these are crucial questions, which are related to the teaching of ethics itself.

What needs to be established is whether there is a chance that our academic teaching of philosophy could profit from studying the methods and ideas of our ancient predecessors. What were their specific methods and their ideas? What was their purpose? Epictetus himself points out the difficulties related to the philosophical teaching of the principles related to a way of living. Epictetus himself is a philosopher-teacher. He represents the ultimate example of what we seek to investigate in the present paper. As we have already said, Epictetus makes an effort to teach the philosophical principles he believes in. Nevertheless, in the sixth chapter of his fourth Discourse, he points out that a lot of people are not receptive to admonitions regarding the good and the bad. He says that Jupiter himself could not convince all men. What is, I wonder, the nature of this intervention? What is the difference between those who are capable of being convinced and those who are not? Does conviction depend on the dexterity of the philosopher who teaches? These questions require some answers in order for us to be able to understand the character of philosophy students, who are meant to be positively influenced by the teachings of their instructor.

Epictetus clarifies that, firstly, one ought to be sure oneself, of the principles one believes in, before one makes the attempt to teach these principles.1 Nevertheless, I believe we have to determine the causes and the nature of such insightful certainty. Moreover, according to Epictetus, when students have taken courses in philosophy and have acceded to these philosophical teachings, then they have to act according to the principles they profess.2 That is a crucial philosophical problem. It reminds us of the distance between a theoretical ideal and its application or materialisation. According to Epictetus, the genuine adoption of philosophical theorems leads to a real reformation of morals. Thus, one has to abandon the attitude of the private individual, of the common person, and fulfil the ideal of a man in moral progress ('prokopton').3 Nevertheless, the problem of the distance between the man in progress and the wise man, regarded as the ideal of stoic philosophy, is well-known.

Epictetus believes that in the course of a philosophical apprenticeship, theory itself precedes. Philosophical teaching itself consists of a display of philosophical principles. However, the success of philosophical initiation does not consist of merely a cerebral strengthening of philosophical principles, but, pre-eminently, demands that they be productively assimilated and that they be applied to the circumstances of one's everyday life.4 That is what was meant to be the scope of philosophical education. Is there any possibility that nowadays we could suggest such a scope? What would that imply for the academic teaching of philosophy?5

In Epictetus' first Discourse, one can read more on the subject. One of his students claimed that philosophical behaviour could not be taught. If that is true, then nobody could condemn someone for their moral behaviour. So, the conclusion is that moral behaviour is conditioned by an inevitable necessity, which could not be reversed by philosophical teaching. If, however, on the other hand, philosophical morals could be taught, then anyone could profit from the teaching of those who claim to be philosophers. Ignorance of philosophical principles, in this respect, is the source of moral faults, the cause of moral failure.6

In the second Discourse, Epictetus, the philosopher-teacher, thinks hard about the hindrances he faces in his attempts to teach his principles. He identifies three main factors in philosophical initiation. The first factor is the teacher, the second is the student and the third factor is the objective of philosophical teaching. The failure of philosophical teaching is due, without doubt, to one of these three factors. Epictetus concludes that failure is due only to the two participants in this philosophical initiation.7

Regarding the students of philosophy and the hindrances which are due to them, Epictetus says that in certain cases their soul is mortified in such a way that the student does not accept the most obvious truths.8 Consequently, it is difficult for them to be dissuaded. That was the case of the Academicians and the Sceptics, who persisted in their weakness to learn the truth about things.9 Other students, also, full of pride, approach the philosopher out of a need to satisfy their vanity. They listen to his instruction in order to learn things that they do not know, without, however, having the necessary respect for their teacher. On the contrary, they have a disposition to judge, as though, indeed, they were already wise enough to do so, the teacher whom they, themselves, have chosen.10 Usually, also, aspiring young philosophers do not approach their teachers in order to discover something about their lives. Rather, they seek to find teachers of arguments. These teachers impress with their oratory and their capacity to formulate arguments, and not, of course, with their moral behaviour. 11

According to Epictetus, teaching philosophy cannot be the work of an upstart. It is not possible for just anyone to teach philosophy. It is, rather, supposed to be a 'big' undertaking, a 'secret' undertaking. The wisdom of a philosopher is simply not enough. A special capacity is needed. Epictetus believes that God himself is the one who gives the teacher of philosophy the permission to teach. Those who take the risk of teaching philosophy, without having such an authorisation to do so, defame philosophy itself.12 Indeed, such an attitude is due to a misinterpretation about the nature of philosophy. Those who share this opinion, consider philosophy to be the aimless consumption of theories, which bear no relation to life, and that is what Epictetus castigates. This is not Epictetus' ideal of the philosopher. Epictetus' own model is Socrates. Socrates did not claim that he knew or that he was teaching anything at all. He did not adopt any theory and he did not seek to promulgate any doctrine.

From this point of view, Epictetus seems to be at odds with his own doctrine, because he seems to adopt an attitude which is inconsistent with that of Socrates. But this is not true. Epictetus wants to accentuate the model of the philosopher who lives his philosophy. He stresses that philosophy affects life. He insists that philosophy could make life less burdensome, less jeopardised by bodily and mental passions. The teacher of philosophy has to become an example of this attitude.13

Besides, Socrates' case is not so simple. Let's remember some things about him. In his Apology,14 Socrates says that he has never been anyone's teacher.15 In Meno, also, he insists that he doesn't teach anything, but he always asks questions.16 According to David Fortunoff '... the Socratic method is creative insofar as it produced cognitive gain or a changed perspective. It guides us anew each time to just and right human responses. It provides the guidance for initiatory responses demanded by each uniquely evolving occasion one faces.'17 Fortunoff's view is representative of the point we are trying to make, meaning that Epictetus sees in Socrates' figure the model of the philosopher who connects his way of philosophising with life.

In fact, Socrates does not believe that 'kalokagathia' can be taught. He does not believe that there are either teachers or students of virtue.18 Teaching something means that there is something to be learned, and virtue could be taught if it had the character of 'science'.19 But virtue is not a science, for the exact reason that it cannot be taught. Men of virtue, also, cannot make others the same as themselves, because they did not become what they are through 'science'.20

Nevertheless, Socrates declares that he was looking around for teachers who teach about the well-being of the soul.21 Without a doubt, he is referring to philosophy teachers, and philosophy, here, as in the case of Epictetus, is thought concerned with passions. One can teach philosophy only to those who understand that the well-being of their soul prevails, in contrast with, and even for the sake of, bodily health. Augustin Basave has an interesting idea on this subject. In his paper entitled 'Integral Philosophy of Education: A New 'Paideia'' he notes that:

personalised education does not exclude that which is essential—common and equal—in all human beings; instead, it invigorates and justifies the individual himself or his individual personality. Body and soul are susceptible to acquiring perfection and beauty, as Plato wished. This perfection assumes there is a natural, progressive and systematic development of all of man's superior abilities.

I believe that this is most obvious in Epictetus' philosophical attitude and in his ideals of philosophy and teaching philosophy.22

For the sake of accuracy, now, I have to recall that, according to Socrates, the therapy of the soul is due to 'good words'. Thanks to them, a human soul becomes filled with wisdom ('sophrosyne').23 A wise soul is a good soul ('agathi psyche').24 Besides, the most crucial problem, according to Socrates, is the weakness of those who are overcome by pleasures and not doing their best, even though they are aware of it. That is the problem which Socrates asks Protagoras to face and to teach some things about.25

Looked at from this point of view, what is our conclusion? As I have already said, Epictetus points to Socrates as a paradigm of his ideal of the philosopher who lives his philosophising. Epictetus himself was such a philosopher. He lived his philosophy, which was stoicism. He lived the life of 'a real philosopher'. Socrates offered himself as a paradigm to his so-called students. Epictetus did the same thing too. So, whatever the results of their efforts, whatever the effect of their lessons, the first thing we learn from them is that their life is their profession and their profession gives shape to their lives. Epictetus and Socrates are philosophy teachers or teachers of philosophising. That was their life, their aim in life, the way they lived their lives. So, both of them have a common outlook. As I said, they offer themselves as paradigms to their students.

So, what could they teach us, those two philosophers, who were two of the most eminent philosopher-teachers of ancient times? First of all, we learn that we have to live our lives as philosophers or, at least, as philosophy teachers. We have to offer ourselves as paradigms. Secondly, we have to bear in mind that philosophy represents an individual's stance towards life. So, when we teach many theories, we have to give our students the understanding that each one of those theories represents a different kind of stance of an individual—of a philosopher—towards life, or towards a problem in life. So, from this point of view, we could play the role of instructors in ethics, who make propositions regarding stances towards life, through presenting the theories we teach as paradigms of stances towards life. Epictetus himself does this very thing by presenting Socrates and his philosophy as a philosophical proposition of a stance towards life.

Finally, since we are talking about education, I would like to finish my analysis with a comment made by Jonathan Cohen, in which he accentuates the importance of the teaching aspect of philosophy or of philosophy as education:

we are pointed to look for essential interconnections between philosophy and education ... In regard to the former, we should keep in mind that philosophy, as the love of, and consequently search for, wisdom, is indeed synonymous with education in the sense of an individual's search for learning. But philosophy, as we noted above, is not only a search for wisdom but conveying of that wisdom to others as well, and thus corresponds also to education as teaching. Dewey goes so far as to define philosophy as 'the general theory of education.26

If John Dewey is right, then we could definitely profit from the study of the philosophers who see philosophy as a matter of education. All the rest is a matter of handling that very nature of philosophy. Each one of us is trying to find his own way, but what is for sure is that we are obliged to take up the challenge of teaching our students so that they can give shape to their own lives, as ancient philosophers did.

Endnotes

  1. See Discourses 4,6,5,3 – 7,1. Nevertheless, what is the contribution of the philosopher-teacher about? He probably clarifies the principles which anybody formulates as rules for one's life, during repeated efforts to discover the truth related to one's problems. The factors, of course, which govern our perseverance with such insightful certainty, need to be investigated and determined. One of these factors would be, probably, the maturation of an idea, which becomes conviction.
  2. See the fourth Discourse 4,6,12,1 – 12,4.
  3. See Handbook, 51.
  4. See the first Discourse 1,26,3,1 – 5,1.
  5. There would seem to be no sure answer to that question since, on the one hand, certain contemporary philosophers, like Giuseppe Boncori, in his 'Teaching Philosophy as Education and Evaluation of Thinking' (20th World Congress of Philosophy, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/), J. Aultman Moore, in his 'Shame and Learning in Plato's Apology' (20th World Congress of Philosophy, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/) and Heather L. Reid, in her 'The Educational Value of Plato's Early Socratic Dialogues' (20th World Congress of Philosophy, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/) take an optimistic view, while W. T. Schmid, in his 'Socratic Paideia: How It Works and Why It So Often Fails' (20th World Congress of Philosophy, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/), on the other, express doubt about whether the teaching of ethics can be efficacious in the formation of moral behaviour. Clearly, this is a matter in which there is room for more discussion.
  6. See Discourses 1,26,5,1 – 7,2. However, what kind of moral knowledge is this, which prevents one from moral faults? What is its nature? Is it knowledge that precedes the fault and anticipates it? Or, on the other hand, is it knowledge which follows the fault and acts as a future deterrent, in order for the fault not to be repeated? Nevertheless, is there a possibility that one cannot afford to avoid moral faults, even if one has received a punishment for these faults?
  7. See Discourses 2,19,29,1 – 34,3.
  8. One could claim, however, that the verisimilitude concerns ideas which are recognisable only by those who, in any case, adopt these ideas.
  9. See Discourses 1,5,1 – 1,5,5,1.
  10. See Discourses 2, 21, 8, 1 – 12, 1.
  11. See Discourses 3, 5, 15, 1 – 19, 2.
  12. See Discourses 3, 23, 14, 4 – 18, 5.
  13. See Discourses 3, 21, 17, 1 – 23,1.
  14. See Apology, 33a1 – 33b3.
  15. For the two most general definitions of teaching, see Sophist, 229a3 – 230a10 and 231a6 – 231c6. See also Cratulys, concerning the art of teaching as onomatology: 388b7 – 389b6, 428d1 – 429a1, 435d4 – 436a6.
  16. See Meno, 82e4 – 82e13 and, also, 84c10 – 84d8. Concerning the dialogue in Meno, one can see the analysis of Robert S. Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, in Philosophers on Education, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1963, pp. 29 – 34.
  17. See David Fortunoff, 'Dialogue, Dialectic, and Maieutic: Plato's Dialogues as educational models', 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August 10 – 15, 1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/ , d.a. 14/11/2004.
  18. See Meno, 89d3 – 89e9 and, also, 96c.
  19. See Meno, 87b2 – 87c12.
  20. See Meno, 98d10 – 99b9.
  21. See Laches, 185d5 – 185e6.
  22. See Augustin Basave, 'Integral Philosophy of Education: A New 'Paideia'', 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August 10 – 15, 1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/, d.a 20/11/2004.
  23. See Charmides, 156e1 – 157c6.
  24. See Gorgias, 506d8 – 507a4.
  25. See Protagoras, 352e5 – 353a6.
  26. Jonathan Cohen, 'Philosophy is education is politics: A somewhat aggressive reading of Protagoras 334d – 338e.' 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August 10 – 15, 1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/, d.a. 19/11/2004.

 

This page was originally on the website of The Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies. It was transfered here following the closure of the Subject Centre at the end of 2011.

 

-
The British Association for the Study of Religions
The Religious Studies Project