BASR: Discourse Journal

Teaching and Learning > DISCOURSE

What dialogue for the electronic era?

Author: Alex Zistakis

Journal Title: Discourse

ISSN: 2040-3674

ISSN-L:

Volume: 8

Number: 3

Return to vol. 8 no. 3 index page

Even those who know nothing, or very little, about information technology (IT or ICT, as is commonly called), readily agree that it is a thing of the future. In fact, for most people, it is the future that is already here. That alone would be enough to convince us that, first of all, something is different in our basic perception of the world and ourselves in it. For, if one considers that future was (once upon a time) conceived as something always indefinitely postponed and generally indefinite and uncertain, something that is always far away and yet to come, then statements like the one above witness a decisive change in the way we conceive and perceive time. And that is usually where everything begins and/or ends: with time and in time.

In our time, therefore, we expect and observe how this already present future is doing all kinds of great things in different domains, and perhaps most of all in education and for education. In the latter, the leading role is undoubtedly played by e-learning. In other words, e-learning is the word of contemporary educational theory and practice—exactly the thing that opens so many creative and positive perspectives on all sides of educational spectrum. What is more, all the present and potential benefits of e-learning seem to fit well within the whole of western (i.e. European) intellectual, spiritual and cultural traditions.

In the first place, it is the product of these traditions; that is, it has been moulded by and within the typically European cultural space and mindset, thus completely belonging to that frame of mind and reference. This is particularly the case in the sense that it corresponds to some diachronic western values, principles and ideals, which have been the lasting inspiration and foundation of our educational systems and criteria. These criteria, on the other hand, demand that one takes e-learning in/from a historical perspective. For historicity is the hallmark of European reason and reasoning. Namely, it is the characteristic of the western mind to maintain that there cannot be any future without a proper past, i.e. without its proper historical origin. Differently put, that which has no past cannot have any future; there is no future for those who have no past. Only the past can have future. Indeed, future gains its presence from and through past, just as past becomes present on account of the future that issues from it. We shall now turn to this complex historical relationship and to the historical origins standing beneath the project of e-learning hoping to contribute to our understanding of this future that unfolds itself as we speak.

To begin with, one finds a similar complex and entangled unity of past and future in other, typically European, intellectual creations, most notably in philosophy and in its probably best known feature: the dialogue—that is, in the generally dialogical nature of philosophical thinking. The similarity, or better kinship, is so striking that one can hardly think of a better and more appropriate application of the e-learning resources and techniques than philosophy itself and philosophical dialogue in particular.

Therefore, at first sight, the discursive forms and procedures related to and often identified with the notion of dialogue and especially of dialogical thinking and research seem to represent all the very best that European thought (on both sides of the Channel) has come up with over the centuries of intellectual and scientific development. Dialogue indeed seems to capture and represent everything good in it, most of all and above all those fundamental ('sacred') values of European culture such as openness, understanding, tolerance, freedom, solidarity and equality.

Furthermore, it is a common conviction that especially education for and through dialogue brings a distinctive ethical dimension to the sciences in general and humanities in particular. The culture of dialogue is upheld by the ethics of responsibility and for its part contributes to its development and strengthening. For the necessary presuppositions of any dialogue are fairness and responsibility. In other words, in order to be able to participate in a dialogue, in order to be admitted to it in the first place, one must be equal to others and treat them as his/her equals, which implies an equal share in time, space and practice of the common discourse. This common discourse, on the other hand, enables dialogue just as much as it is established and articulated through it. Which, of course, implies and presumes a shared, commonly accepted framework of values that has been transformed into and preserved as the very discursive framework within which (and according to whose guidelines) the dialogue takes place. And, for all that, one needs a whole set of virtues, which could collectively be named civic virtues, and therefore must respect and possess a certain set of ethical principles. Hence, also, the emphasis on responsibility: in the first place the responsibility for public speech and discourse, and then also the responsibility for the dialogue itself (which is all decisively funded upon and included in citizenship as their common denominator). Namely, every participant in the dialogue is responsible for maintaining a certain etiquette of dialogue, which includes fairness in conduct and comportment towards the other participants, thus guaranteeing that equality and freedom are fully respected and practiced in the dialogue. Therefore, it is believed, any kind or model of learning should (indeed must) not only comprise dialogical forms but actually be based on them. This particular belief is, of course the living legacy of the ancient beginnings of European, i.e. western, culture and civilization.

In fact, the whole set of values and principles outlined above presents just about the entire relevant legacy of ancient times, and therefore one often tends to regard dialogue as the form that contains and preserves this legacy—in a nutshell, its survival. Indeed, it seems all but accidental that it is one of the few ancient terms that have been preserved and handed over to us almost intact; that is, neither its form nor its content seem to have been altered significantly over the past twenty five or so centuries. Even in its lexical form and its etymology, it still preserves and epitomizes the same insistence on rationality, inter-subjectivity, tolerance and responsibility; that is, apparently exactly the same values and faculties emphasized by the Greek term itself. For, on the one hand, the prefix δια in the διαλογοσ(thus making it a δια-λογοσ) adds an important element to speech and discourse (i.e. to λογοσ), an element that has been translated into other European languages and transmitted to this day by the corresponding prefix 'inter-,' which clearly points at the inter-relatedness, plurality or multiplicity of the agent of a dialogue (or at the need for at least a dyad in any such discourse), and thereby at the mutuality, relationality and collectivity of its procedures. So, this δια of/in the dialogue emphasizes the inter-subjective character of the latter, and through that also the necessity of co-operation, thus finally giving the term 'dialogue' the meaning of inter-locution.¹ On the other hand, the same prefix taken in its widely known meaning puts an unequivocal emphasis on speech and rationality, i.e. insists that discussion and investigation be conducted through (δια) speech and reasoning (λογοσ), by means of language and discourse, or by full awareness not only of the demand for the absence of coercion or oppression but also of the responsibility for one's own discourse; which also immediately implies understanding of the speech of the other and by extension tolerance for the other and the recognition of the other's right to speak.

Should this intactness of meaning and form of dialogue still apply, then one tends to think that, quite reciprocally, this form of discourse should itself be perhaps the only one completely preserved piece of that tradition; and therefore that all the relevant forms and models of dialogue that we now possess were already welded and coined then and there.

Of course, this legacy could not survive without certain fundamental convictions and values also being preserved in one form or another, and there again dialogue seems to summarize and represent them in the clearest way. Some of these convictions and principles are, for example, the belief in common foundation of language and thought, e.g. some kind of community and coexistence, or of communication and understanding; which belief directly implies the belief in the activity and practicability of thought, and the latter amounts to the specific understanding of discourse—and primarily of its privileged form: of the dialogue—as the essential practice of thinking, which as such enters the life-world and continues to function in it. Beneath this, one finds another set of propositions, which basically claims that there exists some general meaning and some diachronical ideas; that there exist some meanings common to humanity, meanings accessible and open to the general human power of thinking. This is actually a belief in the possibility of and the need for the liberation of speech as an expressive and communicative means, in the possibility of translating one code into another, in the possibility and the necessity of transporting and transplanting ideas, positions, conceptions and projects from one realm to another; this belief, however feeble and fragile it may be, establishes and enables understanding, communal life and action in general. For its part, the possibility of communication and understanding establishes and conditions the obligation to talk, the duty to communicate, the necessity of dialogue. Thus, in all its intellectual and emotional intensity, dialogue is above all an exemplary specimen of an authentically human—and that, in the key of the ethics of responsibility, means also philosophical—relationship with the world and time one lives in.

As has been pointed out above, dialogue is a very old philosophical gesture, one of the oldest, almost as old as philosophy itself. In it, one finds an almost classical, or at least traditional impulse of/to philosophy, a constant effort to pose even the most traditional questions of philosophy, as well as the hope of, not so much the solution, as the understanding of the problem. As such, it could certainly serve as an excellent lesson on philosophizing, e.g. on both philosophy and the philosopher in (as it is usually said) their time. More precisely, it points at two mutually tightly bound fundamental questions of philosophy and theory in general: the question of their practicability and the question of the character and status of their discourse.

The question of the kind of relationship with the world one lives in that is most proper for a philosopher, the question that concerns the very essence, meaning and significance of philosophy for man, is as old as philosophy itself. Philosophy has always guarded its practical, that is, its active side, and treated it as the condition of its survival. What is more, the necessity of the dialogue is constantly placed and confirmed within the framework of a specific language pragmatics. That is why different enemies of philosophy, and most of all those reared by philosophy itself, almost always either commenced or ended with the destruction of its practical side and meaning. The fact that they have most often done that starting from philosophical discourse, more precisely from its own discursive character, indicates that the crusaders of thought understood very well that philosophy is practical already on that level, or that at least the traditionally practical meaning and sense of philosophy cannot be overturned or overcome without an intervention in the discourse, that is without the attack on the discursiveness of philosophy.

But, what exactly does it mean that philosophy is primarily a discursive activity, skill, craft and phenomenon? Which essential element of philosophy conditions its discursiveness? It is difficult to answer these questions with certainty. It is especially difficult to give one and only one lasting and irrefutable answer, an answer that would be valid always and everywhere, for all times and circumstances. This impossibility, however, certainly does not imply a general impossibility of answering. It is just that this (im)possibility of a definite answer is neither primary nor decisive for our problem.

It seems that there exists something more primary and important, and that is the questioning itself. Namely, it seems that only (or already) the question establishes and conditions the discursiveness of philosophy; that the typical discursive structure question-answer cannot exist without the former, and that the necessity or the need for an answer can emerge only from the question, not vice versa. The question always precedes the answer, and in the case of philosophy it usually issues from it. The answers to traditional philosophical questions most often do not have any other result than posing more questions—which demand more answers in order to acquire only even more complex questions, and so on and so forth. Hence, the traditional philosophical position towards the world is the relation of questioning, that is, of bewilderment over the world, which has as its special value the treatment of that world as a living being and collocutor. That relation is deeply discursive—it is the relation of discourse, of discussing with the world, on it and about it, which, of course, in the first place implies the questioning and the discussion of one's own place and situation in that world, hence simultaneously and primarily the question of oneself: gnothiseauton has always necessarily been the cognition of the world as well.

Furthermore, this is the position of radical questioning and of radical instinct for knowledge and cognition. For that reason the dialogue, as the immediate form of that relationship, is necessarily radical as well. More precisely, dialogue is not a philosophical dialogue if it does not investigate both the thing itself and its own form and meaning. Dialogue, therefore, has to establish the conditions and characteristics of its existence over and over again and thus put into question the discursiveness itself. Or, put in more modern terms, philosophical dialogue is self-reflexive and methodologically oriented, just like the very discourse in which it is placed and fitted. However, what are at work here are only the interventions in the discourse, not in the world. The interest of philosophy, of theory and thought in general, is not (or not any more) the intervention in the object of discourse itself. Philosophical position and relation towards the world is, hence, not technological but exactly dialogical.

This is partly because the discourse is now understood differently. It is no longer a precursor or an extension of action, nor is it a powerless testimony or a comment of the world. On the contrary, the discourse has long ago become not only the integral part of the life-world, but exactly the ground upon which this world is happening and being confirmed. Discussion has become a way of life, or is on the way of becoming so. Therefore, then, one can no longer talk about the power of knowledge and the like. Discourse has acquired the same status as life; namely, it has become something given and self-understood, something whose existence—but also its purpose and function—is not questioned or doubted, but rather simply defended and guarded against the atavistic attempts to suspend or destroy it. It is no longer possible to ask why discourse, discussion etc., nor does anyone ask about the value of discourse any more. This not so much because discourse is some irreproachable or ultimate value, but rather because discourse, just like life, evades evaluation and estimation. In any case, in the European intellectual code it is really difficult to imagine how one could ever doubt the very foundation, the most proper sphere and form of thought.

In an altered form and under different circumstances, philosophy has returned to the dilemmas and alternatives from the past, thus again dealing both with its past and its structure, function and meaning, with its horizon and scope. Having abandoned (or being in the process of abandoning) teleological meaning and aspirations as well as the phase of its technological functionality, together with the question and positions that accompany it, philosophy again does what it has always known best: it examines its own proper framework and possibilities. And of course, this examination necessarily follows two directions: the direction of the investigation of its own presuppositions and structures, on one hand, and the direction of determining its own proper position and situation in the (non-discursive) world. Thus, then, its internal dissension, as well as contemporary situation, imposes dialogue as the crucial form and problem of contemporary thought—and no less so, social and political practice.

This movement, which is deeply rooted in the very tradition of philosophy, immediately raises the question of the nature of this dialogue, that is, of what the real philosophical dialogue is and what it looks like. An answer to this question at once emerges as a universal solution to the general problem of dialogue, i.e. of any possible dialogue, of all kinds of dialogues. And of course, whomever we may ask, s/he would tell us the same thing as philosophers. More precisely, s/he would repeat the same phrases we have heard or read so many times before. S/he would tell us that dialogue supposes openness, understanding, tolerance, freedom, solidarity and many other such positive words and concepts.

Unfortunately, such statements do not come even close to real understanding of the presuppositions and the form of a true dialogue. Piled up in this way, they remain mere phrases and one could repeat them until the end of time without ever giving them any meaning and sense. What is more, every such repetition only empties them and makes them even more senseless; and that is arguably exactly opposite to what a philosopher is supposed to do. From the latter, one would expect to give certain significance and meaning to those words, to show and produce their meaning not only in thought and for thought but also in the world and for the world. For, the world is always the world of thought and is the world only for thought. What that world will be like depends on thought. But, at the same time and for the same reason, thought has to dwell in the world; it has to exist in and as that world. In that respect, thought is not worth much if it does not relate to the world, that is, if it is not active, present and effective in it. Thought is either active in the world or neither it itself nor the world exists. Thought is always practical and dialogue is the realization and confirmation of its practical character. Or, in other words, dialogue is the practice of thought—thought itself in action.

That is exactly why determining what the form of that dialogue will be is so important, i.e. how it will be conducted, under what conditions, on what assumptions and with what aims. For, in the last instance, possible results and insights of the dialogue depend on the chosen model of dialogue. Specific forms and models of dialogue determine possible insights and products of the discourse; they make the selection of possibilities (of probable directions and operations of thought) and program the results of the discussion. And that exactly because of the already mentioned fact that the question-answer structure is determined by the former, e.g. that the question establishes and determines the direction, content and structure of discourse.

Therefore, the question of the choice of discursive model is extremely important, even decisive, for the contemporary situation of thought. However, it is not about mere analytical recognition, definition and classification of types and models of discourse. It is of utmost importance for the contemporary situation to opt for the model that best secures the openness of discourse. Hence, it is about opening. Opening has become the vital issue of theory, the issue that decides on its very survival. To the extent in which contemporary situation seems like an impasse, to the extent in which it is marked by violence and repression of all kinds, the prevailing model is exactly the closed one, the selective and programming model of discourse and dialogue, which only annihilates its own discursiveness and reduces itself to pure force and power. Exactly this last model is equally endorsed by the so-called engaged intelligentsia, by different programmers and strategists who present themselves as the subjects and owners (possessors) of truth, and generally as the connoisseurs and planners of future. In one way or another, to a higher or lesser extent, this model could be endorsed by anybody and everybody engaged in education.

Given what has been said above about dialogue as a discursive form that preserves and conserves the ancient values and principles for our and subsequent ages, one certainly feels the need to reintroduce the ancient models and forms into the contemporary discussion about the nature of dialogue and its applicability in modern world, especially with regard to its integration in an educational process marked by new means, techniques and technologies.

Therefore, somewhat paradoxically but certainly not surprisingly, this opposition between the closing discourse, on one hand, and the openness towards the other and different, on the other, acquires the shape of a reversed image of some ancient discussions, in the first place the one between Socrates and the Sophists. Only, today, it seems that the Sophists would be the proponents of the opening trends of our times. In order to explain this better, let us take a couple of classical examples: Plato's dialogues Gorgias and Protagoras.

In the Gorgias this acquires a somewhat milder form and is not as aggressive and provocative as in the Protagoras. Here, the dialogue maker Socrates seems to rather flatter the rhetorician Gorgias in order to allure him into the form he himself feels much more comfortable with and for which he is sure in advance to bring him victory, Thus, Socrates, affectedly naively, says:

Would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue our present method of conversing by question and answer, postponing to some other occasion lengthy discourses […]? You must not, however, disappoint us in your promise but show yourself ready to answer the question briefly.²(449b)

The first thing one notices is, of course, the fact that Gorgias did not promise anything regarding the form of the discourse, and particularly not that he will discuss dialogically and answer briefly. These and other similar traps hide the militaristic nature of this specific form of discourse, namely Socrates' understanding and practising it as a tactical strategy for dealing with the opponent/enemy. It is generally characteristic that, in the Socratic matrix, the interlocutor is always understood as an opponent/enemy, as someone who has to be conquered, beaten and eventually humiliated. And when Gorgias tells him that 'there are certain answers […] that must necessarily be given at length,' immediately adding benevolently that he 'will attempt to answer as briefly as possible' for his claim is that 'nobody could give the same answer more briefly' than himself (449b-c), that does not mean that he thinks that really everything can be investigated through short questions and even shorter answers like 'yes' and 'no.' However, that is exactly how Socrates understands the whole thing, that is (as it becomes clear later in the dialogue) as simplification of thought and shrinking of the procedure, which results in the filtering of facts and positions so as to come to the preconceived solution (so one wonders whether that result was not in fact the intended goal all along). Hence, Socrates can't wait and immediately adds:

That is what I want, Gorgias; give me an exhibition of this brevity of yours, and reserve a lengthy discourse for another time. (449c)

This fragment from the eternal discussion between the so-called philosophers and the so-called Sophists today seems to be a little different than it used to be. With the experience of contemporary politics and discourses, the dialogue itself, its forms and the right to it, have become more complex than ever. Consequently, it is necessary to discern its different forms and uses. Socratic endorsement of dialogue reveals itself here as a tendency towards its abuse. Namely, it constantly poses certain preliminary conditions, distorts and confuses theses, while the occasional reductionism turns out to be verbal terrorism and demagogy through and in the name of dialogue. And all the theses and positions that Socrates thus defends or proves become worthless exactly because of the procedure he uses. Distortion of theses, demagogical invocation of commonsensical positions when and where it suits him, therefore largely arbitrary and voluntaristic, and all that for the sake of the desired effect, are simply too gross to be easily overlooked.

Plato certainly could not overlook this, so he, later in the dialogue, through Callicles' voice, puts forward the famous remark about demagogy:

Socrates, though you claim to pursue the truth, you actually drag us into these tiresome popular fallacies, looking to what is fine and noble, not by nature, but by convention. Now, for the most part, these two, nature and convention, are antagonistic to each other. And so, if a man is ashamed and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. And you have discovered this clever trick and do not play fair in your arguments, for if a man speaks on the basis of convention, you slyly question him on the basis of nature, but if he follows nature, you follow convention. For example, in our present discussion of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus spoke of what was conventionally the more shameful, you followed it up by appealing to nature. For by nature everything that is worse is more shameful, suffering wrong for instance, but by convention it is more shameful to do it. (482e-483a)

But, this is still not the worst thing. The worst is this conditioning of the form and the procedure of the dialogue, Socrates' constant insistence on brevity, which resembles the lawyers from popular Hollywood movies and TV series with their tricks and cross examinations.

This primary terrorizing of the interlocutor, the imposing of the procedure that not only personally suits Socrates and his temperament, but also necessarily conditions the flow and the result of the discussion—in a word, programming and deciding on a certain type of discourse in advance and often against the will of the interlocutor (almost always when it comes to the Sophists)—fundamentally questions the validity of the Socratic elenchus. And, which is even more important for us here, grants it nothing but negative result and renders his victory a destructive one, i.e. such that indeed prevents a conclusion or closure.

It is characteristic that Plato himself abandoned such a 'line of questioning' as soon as he managed to articulate the dialectical method. This method not only abandons the insistence on the prejudging of the dialogue, but even seems to reject this praised brevity. Namely, dieresis and other dialectical techniques could hardly be applied successfully if one was to respect the Socratic demagogy. On the contrary, the art of distinguishing, which dialectic is, demands long and exhausting investigations, complex argumentations and rejection of every possible banalization, simplification or reduction; as Plato himself often points out every time he speaks about dialectic. Plato had, therefore, understood that the paths towards the fundamental, the elementary, towards the simplest, are necessarily long and complicated, and that the simplest thing (from the point of view of cognition, of course) is simultaneously the most complicated. That is why, in his later (middle and late) dialogues, Plato incorporates the dialogue into the path of the dialectic of reason rather than reducing the latter to the former; thus, at the same time, essentially overcoming and abandoning the dialogue as the form or model of investigation, discussion and, most importantly, means of instruction and teaching.

Eventually, dialogue becomes a post on the path of dialectic, an element of the hypothetical method, an introduction (or initiation) to dialectics that is at the same time made into an object of its investigation and reflection. Such a dethroning, so to speak, of the dialogue simultaneously meant doing away with the aggression that was still all too obviously present in the Socratic dialogue, as well as with demagogy and other concessions to common sense and its doxa—which doxa, of course, meant both the acquired opinions and adopted dogmas of common sense. Thus, a seemingly open structure of the eristic (Socratic) dialogues from the early period gives way to an apparently closed model of the later dialogues. This later model is, however, much more representative of an open investigative discourse, since the closure that it reaches is far from an imposition or incarceration of thought. Rather, it counts on the real continuation of discourse and thus opens a much wider and more comprehensive dialogue than any closing declarations in the eristic dialogues. By setting itself within a general perspective of reason and reasoning, it opens up a dialogue on a much broader level and a much wider plane, a dialogue with both its contemporaries and posterity, a dialogue with humanity in general. This is for the simple reason that it offers a position or proposition that one can discuss, reflect upon, agree or disagree with, at the same time obliging its (present and future) interlocutors to remain on the same level of generality and universality, thus obliging them to take a position of genuine responsibility in and for their own discourse. And this responsibility primarily means common acknowledgment of the fact that the issues in question supersede and surpass any individual interest, desire or preference of actual participants in the present dialogue.

On the other hand, Socrates' aggressiveness, as well as its intertwinement with demagogy, is most clearly expressed in the second dialogue on the Sophists mentioned above, in the Protagoras. First of all, there Socrates reserves for himself the rights he has previously deprived others of. The drastic case is the issue of the length of answers and speeches. Thus, after having ignored Protagoras' remarks that things are not as simple as he tries to present them,³ he insists that they speak briefly (334d-335a) either by practically blackmailing and conditioning his participation upon brevity of speech—and characteristically says: 'If then you are going to talk to me, please use the second method and be brief' (335a1-3)—or manipulates the public opinion, i.e. the public gathered in Callias' house. The latter is even worse, since the present audience is also dragged into the militant logic of the Socratic dialogue by insisting on its continuation as if it were a showdown, a verbal duel.⁴ Of course, the most cynical thing of all—not ironic but cynical and impertinent—is Socrates' later rambling in a long speech of his,⁵ which annuls the whole quarrel about brevity and places him above and beyond agreed rules, so the whole discourse has been usurped.

Therefore, it seems that thinkers and researchers, even then, came up against a dilemma that is still very much alive today and which, when applied to the concerns regarding dialogue, could be expressed in this way: an eristic or a rhetorical dialogue?⁶ If, however, in antiquity, Sophistics with its rhetoric and relativism led to conservatism, opportunism, cynicism and arbitrariness; the long history of philosophy and of European civilization on the whole seems to have produced the adverse effect and overturned the power relations and their meaning. Today many characteristics of Socratic eristic can easily be identified with the programming closing discourse, with the militaristic and exclusivist dialogue that brought about all kinds of regression. If the task of thinking at the turn of the 21st century is to neutralize the effects of such discourse and to offer the alternative or a countermeasure for it, then Sophistic rhetoric emerges as a possible direction. Indeed, since this rhetoric itself is an integral part of that same European civilization and tradition, since it is built into its foundations, it cannot be simply treated as some long lost and then rediscovered elixir of youth. After all, contemporary discourses, as it has briefly been described above, are more mixtures of eristic and rhetorical elements than some pure models and embodiments of only one or the other.

However, for the sake of clarity, one has to expose the two with respect to their dissimilarity and notice that it, first and foremost, concerns their approach to persuasion. Thus, the eristic model remains on the negative side and satisfies itself with just proving the opponent wrong, regardless of what it is that this opponent is proposing; whereas the rhetoric model concerns itself much more with proving itself right and only to that avail resorts to refutation (of other opinions or propositions). Therefore, the former represents refutation for refutation's sake, while the latter uses it in a more pragmatic way, as a means of accomplishing a goal and gaining support for its position, opinions or preferences. No doubt both are still widely used in public discussions of all kinds, and they do deserve a place in these, but the latter is certainly much more appropriate for a learning process, no matter which form it might take.

In the second place, these two models differ significantly with regard to the rules of engagement in a dialogue, and hence also with regard to the dialogical procedure itself. Namely, it follows from the overall negative orientation of the eristic one—and from the ensuing personal character of its refutations, from their eventual reduction to argumentation ad hominem—that it cannot, or at least should not, be too particular about the rules of conduct in the dialogue, nor about adhering to the previously agreed procedures. Thus, one could expect many twists and turns, changes of heart and theses, quid pro quos, manoeuvres and foul play. For, after all, the objective is to discredit and disqualify; to defeat the opponent (often by humiliating or ridiculing him/her, but in most cases by doing both at once) regardless of what he/she stands for. On the other hand, the rhetorical model displays a much more pragmatic and goal oriented approach to and use of the procedural rules. In that respect one could quite rightfully claim that it is actually more cynical about the whole thing; since, while not attempting or venturing to disobey or change the rules, it tries to use them to its advantage, to take advantage of them. This taking advantage of the dialogue, though, shows not only the positive, almost creative and constructive, character of rhetoric, but also bears out the specific character of dialogue as a discursive form; namely, its being a structure much more appropriate for a constructive investigative discussion about real issues of general interest and significance, than for any kind of (personal or factional) rivalry and acrimony.

Therefore, when it comes to the use of dialogue in an educational process and for educational purposes, one is indeed tempted to opt exclusively for the rhetorical model as the one that allows for constructive application. However, neither of these models ever comes in a clear unadulterated state or form. Rather, each bears quite a few elements of the other within itself and is not free from its inputs, influences and interventions. (After all, they are both dialogical forms, aren't they?) Even more important, one must be aware of the fact that neither comes with absolutely pure and good intentions. From their very start, both display a huge amount of ulterior motives and pragmatic aims, and it seems to be of little consequence whether they disregard and abuse the rules of engagement or take advantage and exploit those.

Because of their formal, stylistic and conceptual confoundedness, both eristic and rhetoric must always be carefully employed, constantly bearing in mind the contemporary situation and problems, among which at least some have no counterpart in the past. For, if nothing else, there is the difference in repetition. A repetition is always regarded and experienced differently from the original, even when it comes to an ideal, mechanical, electronic or some other form of copying or reproduction. Productive repetition, as a symptom of the necessity of a creative appropriation and transformation of tradition, as a perspective, or better a prospective gaze backwards, is probably best characterized by the rejection of false and futile discursive and ethical Puritanism. For, as it turns out, only such reiteration enables one to remain on an appropriate level of discursiveness and plead for an ethical position at the time that increasingly looks like the end of every possible ethics.

What really matters, therefore, is the set of values that guides their application as well as their purpose. More precisely, the ethical dimension of the dialogue, its models, procedures and rules of engagement, always takes precedence and one must decide on the ethics of dialogue before even engaging in it; which further means that respect for all those values invoked here in the beginning precedes the actual dialogue. But—and that seems to be the real vexing question, a paradox if you like, of our present situation—these values, common respect for them, and generally the ethical foundations and framework upon which they stand, are a matter of dialogue, and hence represent its transcendental foundations; which is to say that they can only be reached, established and ensured in and through dialogue. But, it seems, not through just any dialogue, and especially not through a dialogue that—having forgotten all about the questioning and the quest (or better, about διαλογοσ)—has become obsessively preoccupied with results and answers.

By way of conclusion, let us here try very briefly to relate the above described nature of dialogue to what seems to be a major contemporary development in both realms, i.e. in dialogical culture as well as in education; in order to pose the question which appears to be crucial for both in our age.

First of all, the most recently developed technologies and tools of communication have, quite expectedly, brought about great excitement in all fields of research and theory (in addition to, of course, other more practical spheres). Educational institutions and agents have been particularly eager to adopt the new methods and technologies, and have been probably most expeditious in their application. Enthusiasm is great, and rightfully so. For, on one hand, we have fully realized and accepted that technology and methodology are anything but neutral, indifferent or irrelevant tools of execution. On the other hand, the new information and communication technologies not only seem to tremendously facilitate dialogue of any kind and thus widen the participation in it, but also seem to take our theory and practice of dialogical thinking and deliberation to a new level.

Speaking of participation, it is commonly accepted that IT both widens the scope and transforms the character of dialogue in education only—as most of us would insist—to make it even more accessible to even larger numbers of people and to increase the autonomy, equality and liberty of its participants. All the principles and watchwords of contemporary educational theory—and especially of the progressive educational doctrines, as opposed to conservative ones —such as: constructivism; collaboration and interactivity;⁸ adaptive and generative learning; development of higher-level cognitive abilities;⁹ the insistence on a de-centred, non-authoritarian approach to learning, the representational and mediated character of knowledge, the highly discursive and interpretative nature of both learning and knowledge, their dependence upon literacy and literate culture etc.,¹⁰ seem to fit perfectly in the IT environment. Or better, the latter seems perfectly designed and tailored to the needs of contemporary progressive tendencies and attitudes towards teaching and learning. Just like dialogue, IT seems perfectly suited for the growing demand and need for communality, co-operation and inter-subjectivity in education, and as such seems to further promote the values upon which our dialogical culture is founded.

But it is precisely here that the question arises as to whether this is really so, and particularly whether the trends are favourable for promoting and advancing dialogue. Namely, is this new situation perhaps prone to exactly the opposite effects, in spite of its being brought about and founded upon dialogue and dialogical thinking/culture? Could this technological development and the respective transformation of our educational theories and practices actually mean the retreat of dialogue? For if, as has been mentioned above, technology is never something neutral and indifferent with regard to its results and products, isn't it only reasonable to assume that this technology might have a reverse effect on its origin? Isn't it at least possible that, as I am inclined to think, the very notion and structure of dialogue will gradually be transformed and end up turning into something else, something so different that it becomes unrecognizable to itself?

To take this point even further, my contention is that this transformation is already taking place, exactly in and through the new technology and the new set of circumstances, conditions and practices it establishes. I shall here take just a couple of examples, one from public discourse and the other from the e-learning practices. As far as the public discourse is concerned, dialogue has almost completely given way to deliberation. That is to say, we do not engage in public dialogue any more. Instead, we deliberate. This is yet another phenomenon of our time which witnesses the reversal of roles between the condition and the effect. Namely, whereas previously theoretical dialogue indeed represented, promoted and confirmed democratic values, but nevertheless served as an investigative tool with clear and strict rules, modes and objectives, which were not subject to consensus or convention; now it seems to have almost completely gone to the other side: to the side of deliberation. One reason for this might lie in the newly acquired nature of dialogue as a means of practical and pragmatic decision-making, which again makes it quite inappropriate for scientific and theoretical investigation and discussion. Or perhaps humanity has reached the stage in its development where it no longer depends on external circumstances and conditions, and therefore doesn't need to know—and even less observe and conform to—objects, facts, factors and situations any more. Regarding the latter, the ever-greater preference for and therefore the increasing prevalence of asynchronous discussions and sessions over synchronous ones in e-learning modules could be significantly changing our very idea of dialogue. Previously having been tightly related to the unique (i.e. unified, continuous) space and time in which only the living physical presence could be achieved—and this kind of presence has always been the hallmark and the necessary condition for conducting dialogue—the occurrence of dialogue has now become independent of the spatio-temporal continuum. It is not, as popular wisdom would have it, that we don't have time for anything. Rather, the structure of time and space has changed in such a way that, in spite of having more time than ever before, we simply cannot use it to communicate in the old way. This, however, seems to significantly influence not only the ways in which we engage in dialogues, but also their very meaning and aims.¹¹ For instance, together with its immediacy and directness, the dialogue loses its highly personal tone and character, and thus enables us to focus on the issues in question rather than on individual idiosyncracies.¹² At the same time, however, it could be argued that this undermines the intellectual community, its structure as well as its significance for academic production; and that, by taking away the proximity, it also damages the continuity of investigation. In other words, it breaks and decomposes the communal train of thought, turns it into a series of sporadic comments on a single issue, and thus effectively erodes the unity of the issue itself.

Whatever the case may be, the transformation of dialogue and dialogical interaction seems to be taking place here and now, in the lived future of e-learning and other virtual practices and dimensions of our life-world.

Endnotes

Symptomatically enough, the (modern) Greek term for the Internet is none other than δια-δικτυο.
Plato, Gorgias, trans. W.D. Woodhead. [All quotations from Plato's dialogues are taken from E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., The collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).]
For example, when it comes to the identity of justness and piety in Protagoras 331a-332a (in Hamilton and Cairns, op. cit., trans. W.K.C. Guthrie).
Compare, for example, the initial Callias' intervention in support of continuing the conversation (335d), or Alcibiades' speech (336c-d). The most characteristic are, however, Prodicus and Hippias (337a-338b), who reveal that it is not a conversation but an argument, a quarrel.
Cf., for example, 342b-346e.
One could also reduce the two poles to the opposition between Socratism and Sophism.
See Rogers (2007).
See, for example, Dillenbourg (1999), Falchikov (2001), Fosnot (1996), Harasim (1995), Laurillard (2002).
Whittle, Morgan & Maltby (2000). See also Mason & Kaye (1989).
For an overview of these terms and concepts that puts them in the perspective of online and e-learning, see Carusi (2003).
Hence, once again, the higher appropriateness of the rhetorical model in our time.
See Barnette (1998), and Weiss (2007a).

Bibliography

Barnette, R.,'Philosophy in Cyberspace', in Bynum & Moor (1998)

Bynum, T. W. & Moor, J. H. (eds.)The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

Carusi, A., 'Taking Philosophical Dialogue Online', Discourse, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Autumn 2003) pp. 95-156.

Carusi, A., 'Some Perplexities of Teaching Philosophy Online', Discourse, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Spring 2006) pp. 153-171.

Dillenbourg, P. (ed.), Collaborative Learning: Cognitive and Computational Approaches, (Oxford: Pergamon, 1999).

Falchikov, N., Learning Together: Peer Tutoring in Higher Education, (London & New York: Routledge, 2001).

Fosnot, C.T. (ed.), Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives and Practice, (New York & London: Teachers College Press, 1996).

Hamilton, E. & Cairns, H. (eds.), The collected Dialogues of Plato, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

Harasim, L., Hiltz, S.R., Teles, L., Turoff, M., Learning Networks: A Field Guide to Teaching and Learning Online, (Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 1995).

Laurillard, D., Rethinking University Teaching: A Conversational Framework for the Effective Use of Learning Technologies. (London: Routledge, 2002).

Mason, R. & Kaye, A. (eds.), Mindweave: Communication, Computers and Distance Education, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989).

Plato, Gorgias (trans. W.D. Woodhead), in Hamilton & Cairns (1978).

Plato, Protagoras (trans. W.K.C. Guthrie), in Hamilton & Cairns (1978).

Rogers, P., 'Undergraduate Philosophy and the Corruption of the Youth', Discourse, Vol. 6, No. 2, (Spring 2007) pp. 185-203.

Whittle, J., Morgan, M., & Maltby, J., 'Higher Learning Online: Using Constructivist Principles to Design Effective Asynchronous Discussion', NAWEB Conference (2000): http://naweb.unb.ca/2k/papers/whittle.htm

Weiss, B.,'Philosophy, Objectivity and Accessibility':(2007a)

Weiss, B., 'Teaching Philosophy in Cyberspace', (2007b)(Review of Barnette 1998):

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