Teaching and Learning > DISCOURSE

AAPT and APA Conference: Report on Graduate Teaching Seminar

Author: Duncan Watson

Journal Title: Discourse

ISSN: 2040-3674

ISSN-L: 1741-4164

Volume: 6

Number: 1

Start page: 89

End page: 105

Return to vol. 6 no. 1 index page

Introduction

The American Philosophical Association and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers jointly support a biennial graduate seminar on teaching philosophy, as part of the AAPT workshop conference. The 2006 seminar took place at Washington and Jefferson College, Pennsylvania, on 2nd August. The seminar aimed to equip graduate students new to teaching philosophy with the requisite pedagogical skills of the profession, with particular focus on those skills that are peculiar to the teaching of the discipline of philosophy. More information about the conference can be found on the AAPT website, http://aapt-online.dhs.org/.

This report is split into four sections that correspond roughly to the four graduate seminars. At the end of each section is a brief bibliography from which thoughts were drawn in the discussion in the seminar, or which might be turned to for further information. The primary aim of this report is to highlight the learning that took place at the graduate seminar; much of this will no doubt be second nature to more experienced philosophy teachers. Hopefully the report will prove a useful starting point for graduate students new to teaching, but perhaps it may contain some useful reminders for those who have been teaching for longer. Much of the material in the report stems directly from the seminar itself, either from the seminar leaders, Martin Benjamin and Betsy Decyk, or from the 14 other graduate students at the seminar. In addition, David Schrader was present for the first day's seminar, and George Macdonald Ross was present for the first part of the fourth seminar.

1. Philosophy and philosophy teaching: an overview

Many students studying philosophy at university will not have studied the subject before; and in addition philosophy is methodologically distinct from other disciplines. These factors combine to present teachers of philosophy with a number of concerns over and above the pedagogical issues that apply across disciplines. Principal among these concerns for the philosophy teacher are that: they must help students see the relevance of philosophical questions; they must not only teach philosophy but also meta-philosophy; and they have to consider their attitude towards procedural neutrality.

To the outsider, and, more pertinently, to the new student of philosophy, the subject matter of the discipline can appear to range from the arcane to the irrelevant. To cultivate in students a disposition to learn philosophy one must instil in them the desire to have philosophical questions answered. It is generally not sufficient to simply provide answers to philosophical questions that students do not have; and students are unlikely to have philosophical questions unless they see the relevance of those questions. Asuccessful approach to teaching philosophy (particularly to new students, but also to experienced students who have not encountered the specific sub-discipline that one is teaching) is likely to include a certain amount of groundwork— enabling the students to appreciate the importance of the questions that will be grappled with. Instead of teaching free will by launching into the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism one might first ask prima facie oblique questions that will lead students to an interest in the freewill debate. As an example: one might ask students whether a 13 year can be held to be accountable for a crime that they have committed. Through Socratic dialogue or group discussion, questions about the nature of freewill will be quickly reached—yet now there is an obvious connection to 'real-world' issues that students care about. Students have demonstrated to themselves that they care about these issues by caring about the initial question that led them to these issues. While it is often obvious to professional philosophers why they should care about philosophical issues it is rarely so obvious to students; this becomes more so as one moves from subjects such as applied ethics to prima facie more distant subjects such as metaphysics. It may instead be that caring about philosophical issues has become the default position for those who have been immersed in the subject for a number of years and that why these issues are important is not reflected on. Either way, it is fruitful to spend some time at the beginning of a course or topic fostering in students a passion for the subject they are about to study. This will be repaid by an improved motivation to learn as well as placing the subject within a framework that is less abstract and so potentially easier to comprehend.

Meta-philosophy is a vast discipline in its own right, and the boundaries between it and philosophy simpliciter are frequently blurred. However, some understanding of the nature of philosophy as a discipline, and the methodological techniques that it employs, is vital if students are to be properly equipped to engage with philosophical questions. Ultimately one may take the stance that one can only fully understand the philosophical endeavour through observing the practice of philosophy. But there is at least some merit in providing explicit instructions and directions on how the subject differs from other disciplines and what it is that makes 'good' philosophy. This is not to exclude the possibility of teaching meta-philosophy through showing examples of good philosophy, but clearly this will be more effective if the aim of showing these examples is made explicit.

Frequently philosophy is perceived as lacking rigour. The prevalence of this perception is higher in those students who study more obviously axiomatised or systematic disciplines such as mathematics and the sciences. It is incumbent on the teacher who wishes to show the distinction between philosophy as it ought to be practised and philosophy as it is often perceived in society at large, to examine, with the students, the norms of rigour within philosophy. One might highlight that while there is no agreed upon answer to many philosophical questions this does not mean that all answers are equally acceptable, that there are answers which are demonstrably wrong and that there are arguments for answers which fail to be suasive when held up to philosophical scrutiny.

It is similarly valuable to appreciate the different forms of question that one might encounter in philosophy. Explicit instruction on the distinction between objective, subjective and normative questions provides students with concepts that illuminate the purpose and methodology of philosophy. By demonstrating the sorts of appropriate answers to the differing types of questions one can show something of how philosophy is marked out. Objective questions require factual answers; subjective questions require sincere reports of personal states; normative questions require coherently reasoned answers. It is normative questions and the mode of answering that provides a paradigm of the philosophical method, and through proper appreciation of this and the difference between what counts as an appropriate answer to normative questions that one can come to learn much of the nature of philosophy as a discipline (Warren, 1998, 262-264).

Kant's approach to teaching philosophy can provide a useful guide to teachers when considering meta-philosophical issues as well as the specific skills that are being imparted. Kant distinguishes between three stages of learning in philosophy, as elucidated by Ladd (1982, 5-6):

[T]he first stage involves developing the understanding through penetrating judgements based on experience and concepts derived therefrom; the second stage uses reason to connect these concepts to their grounds and consequences; and the third and final stage consists in putting all of these together into a well-ordered whole as a science.

This structure can provide a useful framework for considering the developmental stages of those learning to do philosophy. Furthermore, as both Ladd (1982, 6) and Macdonald Ross (2005, 70) have pointed out, the third stage is not necessarily one that all students will reach. The third stage is more directly of use to those pursing a scholarly interest in philosophy, whereas the first two stages are more clearly transferable to the non-academic world. The key point though is that these stages are just that, one must progress through them in order and as such it is sensible to teach in a way that explicitly acknowledges this framework.

The allied Kantian ideal of inculcating autonomy (if that is not oxymoronic) in students when teaching philosophy leads to the necessary consideration of one's stance on procedural neutrality. The balance that needs to be struck is between unduly influencing students on one hand and giving the incorrect impression that anything goes or that one has no firm views on the other hand. If one is teaching ethics and continually reinforces the impression that one is a consequentialist, both by explicitly affirming this and by presenting the arguments for it more strongly than arguments for other ethical theories, then one runs the risk of undermining students' autonomy. Consequentialism will be seen as the right answer and as a result students may fail to appreciate the arguments for other theories. Furthermore their approach towards philosophy as a discipline will be skewed for fear of engaging in contrary arguments in the paradigmatically philosophical manner. At the other extreme complete procedural neutrality, where one gives no clue as to one's philosophical disposition, may alienate students. One may inadvertently give the false impression that one does not have an opinion on the matter; if the teacher has no opinion then it is difficult to see why the student should have one. Additionally students may come to believe that the discipline is concerned merely with exploring arguments in an almost historical manner, without the need to formulate ones own opinion and arguments for that opinion. It is natural to wish to steer between these two extremes, however exactly how one goes about this will depend in part on one's own teaching style, the level of the course, and the students one is teaching. Two approaches one may take: to make explicit one's views and how one arrived at them, while explicitly acknowledging that other views well argued for will be no less favourably looking upon when marking; or to state that one has a reasoned opinion on the issue but that it is felt this may unduly influence students and so will not be discussed. Both approaches have the merit of reinforcing the awareness of autonomy while making students more aware of the pedagogical process and so fostering a feeling of inclusion.

Bibliography

2.The first day of a course, the student-teacher relationship, and assessment and marking

In the first day of a course a teacher has the competing aims of conveying essential information about the administration of the course; conveying the subject matter that can be expected; and enthusing students to study the course. The latter two aims have a certain natural symbiosis, but this symbiotic relationship does not so obviously extend to advising on the administrative matters of the course. How the balance between these aims is struck will in part come down to institutional policies and procedures. There are, however, considerations that apply regardless of one's institution. An awareness of students' needs and desires to pass a course and their consequent anxiety about assessment criteria and deadlines should inform one's attitude to the dissemination of such information. An anxious student who is concerned about how the course is to progress is unlikely to be able to concentrate as well as one who has been appraised of this information at the outset. This is not to stipulate that administrative information ought to be disseminated in the lecture itself, it can be done beforetime (for example by web based syllabi). However it is unrealistic to assume that all students will have read such information beforehand; and equally unrealistic to assume that, despite the elegance of one's legalistic prose, everything will have been fully understood in the manner intended.

Enthusing students and conveying course information can be naturally combined. As is highlighted in section 1, one needs to enable students to reach the point where they are genuinely asking the philosophical questions that the course will help them to answer. There is perhaps more explicit pressure to enthuse students in American institutions where there is greater freedom for students to choose between different courses. However, it is equally important in all institutions that students are keen to learn and can see the relevance of their learning if they are to succeed at their chosen course of study. As such the pressure to motivate students should be felt equally by all who teach the discipline.

One makes an explicit and implicit contract with students about the expectations one has as relates to matters such as the quality of work and their contribution in class. When conveying these expectations the more they can be made explicit the greater the benefit for the student and the student-teacher relationship. But while explicit expectations are laid out at the beginning of a course one ought to be mindful of the way in which ongoing behaviour can undermine the explicit contract. A teacher with a particularly relaxed approach may give the false impression that they will mark generously. Students may feel betrayed when they do not get the marks they were expecting from the implicit messages conveyed by the teacher. It may be necessary then to restate the explicit contract if there is a concern that one's actions may have been interpreted as conveying an unintended implicit contract (Wolcowitz, 1982, 14-17). As well as explicit contracts being undermined by implicit contracts one may also directly undermine the explicit contract by one's actions. If students are advised to read the set text before the lecture each week but one then presents a précis of the reading each week students may interpret this as a signal that they do not need to do the reading. There is little point in setting aims and then providing a disincentive for those aims (or at least no disincentive to not achieve the aims).

When negotiating the explicit contract with students, much can be done to foster a good relationship. An open and positive studentteacher relationship can be formed by making clear to students the criteria for assessment, as well as making clear that it is your aim to enable them to perform as well as possible. The relationship between student and teacher will influence the learning process. A positive relationship will encourage students to ask questions and help to motivate them to learn. A teacher who has an understanding and an awareness of her students will be sensitive to the learning styles and outside influences that may impact on their learning-teaching styles and approaches can be tailored accordingly.

As with expectations of students it is an advantage to be open and explicit about the method and aims of assessment and marking. Wolff distinguishes between three distinct aims that marking may have: criticism; evaluation; and ranking (Wolff, 1969, 59-62). The purpose of criticism is to enable students to learn how to improve their philosophical reasoning through highlighting areas where they have done well and explaining why, as well as showing areas for improvement. Evaluation as conceived here is understood as Scriven's notion of 'summative evaluation' (1973); it provides students with an indication of how well they have performed in the assessment. Typically evaluation will include some kind of explicit mark or grade. Evaluation and the mark that students receive is of importance in so far as it will dictate their overall degree classification and all that goes with that, however the pedagogical aims of evaluation are less obvious. Well structured criticism will often carry with it a strong indication of the overall evaluation, however this need not always be the case. The particularly able student who receives lots of suggestions for how their work could be developed might perceive this as indicating a low evaluation, when in reality the paper is of a high standard and the criticism is of a level that one might provide to a colleague. Evaluation will iron out such ambiguities but should not been seen as a substitute for criticism. Ranking, the putting of students' assessments in order of evaluation, appears to serve little pedagogical purpose. Highly ranked students may become complacent while lower ranked students become disenfranchised, but the evaluative difference between them may be slight.

Well structured criticism is an important pedagogical tool. The criticism need not come solely from teachers. By encouraging students to criticise each others' work students will receive more feedback. Additionally students providing the feedback will learn to recognise those features of philosophical writing that are to be fostered and those that are to be avoided; enhancing their own philosophical writing. The value of criticism (both student and teacher) can be further enhanced by encouraging students to reflect on their feedback; too often feedback is ignored by students, but if a response to the feedback is encouraged then there is greater chance that the purpose of the criticism will be achieved.

Bibliography

3. Ethical relativism, the introductory course, and critical thinking

Frequently students studying ethics for the first time will take a relativist position. While this often may be a philosophically unsophisticated position, asserting little more than universal moral tolerance, it can be instructive to discover the reasons motivating the adoption of this position. Momeyer (1995, 302-305) distinguishes between six reasons why a student may adopt a relativist position; the appreciation of these differing positions can help inform one's teaching practices. As example: should students be relativists because they are concerned about offending others in the class who hold differing opinions, then this affords an opportunity to elucidate the nature of philosophy. The teacher is in a position to enable students to appreciate the power of suasive and reasoned argument; that holding a different philosophical position to others can be justified if backed by argument. This ought not to offend others but rather invite reasoned response if they wish to maintain their differing philosophical stance. Similarly, if students hold a relativist position for fear of having their long-held views challenged this will be a prime opportunity to make clear the distinction between the nature of subjective beliefs, and philosophical opinion that is to be arrived at through reasoned argument.

Concerns raised in section 1 carry over to concerns about students holding unreflective relativist positions. Students do not come to their first ethics class as amoral individuals—many may have strongly held ethical beliefs. If these beliefs have been clung onto in a dogmatic fashion then ethical relativism may seem a natural position to switch to. If the teacher takes time stressing the arguments for and against differing ethical positions then there is the concern that students may simply adopt a relativist position either through inability to discern between the arguments or through the belief that it is not the job of philosophy to discern between the arguments. An appropriate approach towards procedural neutrality should have some impact on whether or not ethical relativism is adopted for these reasons. Finally it can be noted that ethical relativism is not without its proponents, although generally those proponents will adopt a form of relativism that is different to that adopted by students new to ethical theory. Momeyer suggests though that there can be pedagogical advantage to assuming that students do hold a well thought out relativist position (1995, 302-303). One can then draw students to fully realising that position, the philosophical intricacies of it, and how it can be defended as well as argued against. The point is that even if one is not a relativist there is still much philosophical mileage in exploring it as an issue, particularly given that many students take it to be a position that they hold.

The introductory course, the 'Philosophy 101', has greater popularity in America than in the UK. Despite the absence of a specific stand alone, 45 hour, introduction course in the UK many of the considerations that apply to the construction of such a course will carry over to first philosophy courses that students take. Cahn has distinguished between four styles of introductory course (which need not be mutually exclusive): taking readings grouped by topic; studying major historical works as a whole; studying the history of philosophy; and using a single-authored textbook (Cahn 1986). To this list we can add the single topic course advocated by White (1996), where different areas of philosophy are considered by relating them to one theme (White gives the example of freewill).

All styles of course have their advantages and their disadvantages. Taking readings grouped by topics gives an overview of many areas of philosophy but may fail to give a coherent narrative to the history of philosophy. Studying major historical works may fail to inspire students who cannot see the relevance, but if done well can provide a thorough bedrock on which future philosophy courses can build. Studying the history of philosophy gives a sense of the development of the discipline but may fail to grapple in sufficient depth with the philosophical issues if done badly. A single-authored text book (if well written) will provide a flowing treatment of a number of philosophical issues, but may be biased towards the author's particular stance of the issues discussed. The single topic course will aptly illustrate the interconnectedness of the discipline but it requires skill in its construction to hold the interest of students for the duration of the course.

The style that one adopts will be a largely personal choice, reflecting one's preferred teaching style and strengths. However consideration will need to be paid to the makeup and size of class that one is teaching—for example, experience may have taught that a particular class will fail to respond to a historical approach no matter how well it is delivered. In addition to the style that one chooses, there are other goals of an introductory course in philosophy. Section 1 considered some of the issues that need to be grappled with when instructing students new to philosophy. Other issues that ought to be covered, are how to write philosophically and how to read philosophical papers. The latter can be easily overlooked by those who have been reading philosophy professionally, but the reading of philosophy is a new skill to many students, and as such, time spent on it will have a positive impact on students' learning. Even what seems like obvious advice to the veteran philosophy reader can help students new to the disciplineadvising that it takes a long time to adequately read a piece of philosophy will encourage students to spend more time reading while allaying fears that they are not understanding the reading quickly enough. By the same token time needs to be spent making explicit the skills and strengths of good philosophy writing; echoing section 2 of this paper—make clear the method of assessment and why that method has been chosen.

Instruction in critical thinking, either as part of an introductory course, or as a separate, standalone course, can suffer from being too abstract and from using stale and uninformative examples. Work done on the concepts associated with category membership (see Mervis and Rosch, 1981, 95-100 for an overview) suggests that there are certain paradigmatic examples that people associate with different concepts. When asked to think of a bird, many think of a robin but few of a chicken or ostrich. By considering non-paradigmatic examples of concepts when teaching those being taught can gain a fuller understanding of that concept. This thought translates naturally over into the field of critical thinking, often staid examples (such as those that discuss Socrates and his mortality) are used without embellishment; but by fleshing out the area being taught with unusual examples the students have a broader range of examples to draw on when forming the concepts necessary to critical thinking. By extension, while paradigmatic examples of reasoning involved in first order symbolic logic are simply given by formally written first order symbolic logic there are considerable gains to be made by teaching using examples that involve constituents other than letters and the symbols for logical connectives.

Bibliography

4.The use of paraphrased philosophical texts; plagiarism; continued professional development

Jonathan Bennett has paraphrased a number of important philosophical texts as an aid to student learning and understanding. The paraphrasing goes beyond the mere replacement of archaic words and phrases by also making explicit the structure and goal of the piece of philosophical prose in question. For example, the argument for the possibility of a malevolent deceiver at the beginning of Descartes' Second Meditation is introduced in Bennett's paraphrase by explaining the nature of the dialectical technique that Descartes is using. Bennett points out that Descartes is conducting an internal dialogue and both voices of this dialogue are made explicit as if written as a play (1994, 267-268). It seems clear that as an introduction to Descartes' argument Bennett's paraphrase is simpler to understand than even the most contemporary of straight English translations. (Although there may be points of divergence with Bennett over exegetical accuracy.) What is less clear is whether such an aid is indeed beneficial to students in the long run. The analytic reading of philosophical texts is a skill that students will need if they are to continue studying philosophy as well as teaching the more obviously transferable skill of analytic reading simpliciter. If students are only presented with extreme paraphrases of texts then they will clearly get no practice in this skill. But if students struggle to find the argument within dense philosophical passages as they originally appeared then not only are the skills of analytic reading not being fostered but neither are the skills of comprehending philosophical arguments in whatever form they are presented. As with much of the material presented in this paper the approach to adopt will depend on the makeup of the class, and the goals of that class; if students have difficulty in comprehending the original text then one might introduce an extreme paraphrase, but not at the cost of ignoring the original text altogether.

George Macdonald Ross joined the seminar for the plagiarism discussion. Plagiarism in student essays is more common than it ought and needs to be. Plagiarism can be reduced through clear explanation to students of the expectations of them; setting questions that are inherently difficult to answer with a plagiarised answer; and by demonstrating that plagiarism is likely to be discovered.

Students coming from sixth form/FE and from disciplines other than philosophy are likely to have an unclear picture of the expectations about plagiarism. At school students are often encouraged to paraphrase and restate textbook facts; similarly in the more science-based disciplines the standard for plagiarism is very different to that in philosophy. A first step in disabusing students of the justifiability of plagiarism is to make clear that paraphrase (even very radical paraphrase) is not considered to be the writer's own work and needs to be appropriately referenced. It ought to be also made clear that it is not only print and electronic media that can be plagiarised, but that one can also plagiarise notes taken from a lecturer if not appropriately referenced. One ought also make clear that plagiarism is looked for, and if detected will incur penalties for the writer.

Much can be done to prevent plagiarism in addition to simply making students aware of what it is to plagiarise. The questions used in assessing students can have considerable influence on the likelihood of plagiarism. If an essay question is asked, either as coursework or in examination, that can be answered by paraphrasing directly from notes taken from the lectures then it should be no surprise if many of the essays will be such paraphrases. If students have a pre-prepared answer in their notes it will be natural to many to use the structure of those notes for their essay. Furthermore, it may not be considered plagiarism by those doing so. Similarly, if questions are asked that are easily answered by existing print and electronic media then this too invites plagiarism. One might set an essay question that has been asked on many different courses at different institutions. Such an essay is likely to have answers either in textbooks or available over the internet. While the plagiarist who makes use of such sources is more likely to be conscious of the nature of their act this is no argument against not preventing such opportunities arising. Setting questions that have not been asked before, or that make reference to current events, will mean that students are less likely to have prepared sources to plagiarise from, forcing them to write original material. Given that plagiarism is notoriously difficult to spot it is sensible to adopt an assessment strategy that reduces the opportunities for plagiarism.

There is always scope for improvement in one's teaching. The changing and updating of one's courses and teaching style if done well will not only improve the teaching through improved content, but the teaching itself will remain fresh and inspiring for students. It is important to reflect on how well particular seminars or lectures have gone and revise accordingly. Equally student feedback should be solicited as a means of gauging which aspects of one's teaching are successful and which aspects need improving.

Bibliography

Included in the bibliography for this section are a number of resources that can be drawn on throughout one's teaching career to assist when reflecting on one's teaching practice and to provide ideas for new approaches to teaching.

Reflections on the conference

The majority of delegates at the AAPT conference were from the US, and it was instructive for someone with little prior knowledge of the US system to observe the differences between the US and UK. In particular the amount of freedom to alter course descriptions and content as well as assessment methods struck me. Many of the conference workshops, as well as the graduate seminar, discussed innovative methods of assessing students that aim at improving the student learning experience. The ability to be proactive as well as swiftly reactive to student learning needs seemed to be superior within the US system to the UK system.

With students in the US having far greater freedom over which courses they take in any semester there seemed to be greater pressure on teachers to innovate in order to compete for the student share. This innovation need not always be beneficial for student learning, there might be the worry that courses are aimed at the lowest common denominator in order to attract more students. But if there is a need to innovate while retaining high academic standards then one would expect that generally the learning experience will improve. The opportunities for graduate teaching experience in the US are greater than in the UK. Based on anecdotal evidence it seems it is the norm that a graduate student can expect some teaching experience while they are a student. This experience will not be just the equivalent of UK tutoring—graduate students will also have the opportunity to lead and lecture on their own courses. The result is that graduates are able to convincingly demonstrate that they have requisite lecturing skills to prospective employers. But graduates also gain valuable experience in lecturing in an environment that is likely to be more nurturing than when one is a full member of a faculty with all the additional administrative and research pressures. As a graduate student running a course one is likely to have access to other graduate students in a similar position that one can learn from, confident that they are at a similar stage in their lecturing career. In part this opportunity in the US must be down to larger universities and longer PhD's.

Attending the AAPT graduate seminar and the afternoon and evening sessions proved a valuable experience. As with any conference it provides the opportunity to pool knowledge with other delegates, but the range of professionals and students at the AAPT conference is wider than is to be found at many research conferences. By meeting with people from both the continental and analytic tradition and from a spectrum of different institutions I gained a wide selection of insights into teaching best practice. Insights that will hopefully be carried into my teaching practice.

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