Teaching and Learning > DISCOURSE
Beyond Active-Stasis: Reflections on Philosophy, Education and 'Life Satisfaction' in the United Kingdom
Author: Lawrence Harvey
Journal Title: Discourse
ISSN: 2040-3674
ISSN-L: 1741-4164
Volume: 10
Number: 2
Start page: 215
End page: 223
Return to vol. 10 no. 2 index page
Against the backdrop of the current economic downturn, the coalition government in the UK is poised to implement an initiative which seeks to gauge the national mood in terms of happiness. Indeed, despite a degree of 'nervousness' in Downing Street at the prospect of testing the national mood against the backdrop of deep cuts and student unrest, the Office of National Statistics is set to produce quantitative and qualitative procedural measures so as to facilitate the aforesaid government initiative. Some seven years prior to the present economic downturn, the previous UK Government published an analytical paper entitled, 'Life Satisfaction: the State of Knowledge and Implications for Government' (December 2002). The paper, written by Nick Donovan and David Halpern, constituted a discursive interrogation of government policy initiatives in relation to the issue of happiness. Although a wide-ranging report, it also addressed the issue of happiness in relation to education. To my mind, although the report addresses education, it does not fully draw out the positive effects of education in relation to happiness. The purpose of my reflections here will be to demonstrate that the subject I teach, philosophy, can have a positive impact in terms of 'life satisfaction' in a significant manner that goes beyond the economic or vocational factors prioritised by government commentators such as Lord Leitch (Leitch et al, 2005). Of course, as a philosophy teacher I am unashamedly partisan and, as such, make no claims in terms of objectivity or professed impartiality. Nonetheless, I will argue that the abovementioned government initiative is somewhat myopic and contains caveats that can be redressed within the context of my teaching specialism. I will therefore bring to the fore the shortfalls with regard to the on-going emphasis on what Lord Leitch terms economically valuable skills.
In the Executive Summary to the 'Life Satisfaction' paper, it is suggested that there is a 'large and rapidly growing body of research that investigates what makes people satisfied with their lives' (Donovan & Halpern, 2002, p. 2). This issue of satisfaction is, as the report makes clear, complex and to a certain degree, subjective. Yet a key component of self-perceived satisfaction is happiness or what the ancient Greeks more accurately labelled eudemonia (holistic happiness or flourishing). In the spirit of Aristotle, economic factors are clearly pertinent to such a state of holistic happiness or satisfaction—a general point which the aforesaid report makes clear. Moreover, the allied link between education and potential remuneration is perhaps patent. However, beyond this economic correlation, the link between education and 'life satisfaction' is somewhat hazy. Indeed, Donovan and Halpern suggest that, set aside from economic factors, a variety of studies have often found, at most, a small correlation between education and life satisfaction (Donovan & Halpern, 2002, p. 24). I would argue that if this correlation is indeed small, there are serious deficiencies within the education system in the United Kingdom—serious deficiencies which Donovan and Halpern fail to address. It would seem apparent that education and holistic happiness have an interdependent link as Nel Noddings has recently argued in her study of education practice: 'Happiness and education are, properly, intimately connected.' As she clarifies: 'Happiness should be an aim of education, and good education should contribute significantly to personal and collective happiness' (Noddings, 2003, p. 1).
Needless to say however, happiness is a somewhat elusive and much debated term. What exactly is happiness? For utilitarian luminaries such as Bentham and Mill, happiness is what drives us all; we are driven by two 'sovereign masters'—the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain (Bentham, 1962, passim). Indeed, within a utilitarian framework, it is a truism that psychological hedonism is our 'primedriver.' With a little more subtlety perhaps, thinkers such as Aristotle propagated the idea that what is good for the individual and the community at large is a state of eudemonia—a state of human flourishing characterised by an all-pervasive happiness. As Richard Layard has pointed out in a recent study interrogating declining happiness in market economies, our financial situation is significant in relation to this all-pervasive state of happiness; however, it is not necessarily the central driving factor (Layard, 2005, pp. 62-5). Furthermore, as Shah and Marks' research seems to suggest, 'whilst economic output has almost doubled in the UK in the last 30 years, life satisfaction has remained resolutely flat [...]. Meanwhile depression has risen significantly over the last 50 years in developed countries' (Shah & Marks, 2004, p. 4). As Shah and Marks conclude, it would appear that many people are 'languishing rather than flourishing'—that is to say, they are not living the happy and fulfilling lives envisaged by Aristotle (Shah & Marks, 2004, p. 5). To my mind, an educational ideology that attaches itself, leech-like, to what are increasingly purely economic ends can only work to the detriment of what should be construed as a fundamental aim or telos—that is to say, an all-pervasive happiness.
Yet what we might term the 'happiness factor' in education has been traditionally put on the backburner or, indeed, extinguished altogether. As Nietzsche once put it, education is perceived as hard and disciplined: 'much is demanded and sternly demanded' and 'praise is rare' (quoted in Nodding, 2003, p. 44). Thankfully such a picture is undoubtedly an anachronism within mainstream education today. However, as Noddings claims in the Introduction to her book, such a view of education is still prevalent in the popular psyche : 'When I told people that I was writing a book on happiness and education, more than one has responded with puzzlement, "But they don't go together"' (Nodding, 2003, p. 1). The question thus arises: how can education (and specifically my teaching specialism, philosophy) make a positive impact in terms of happiness?
In his book Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, Richard Layard forcibly argues that people's happiness depends upon their 'inner-selves' and their attendant philosophies of life (Layard, 2005, pp. 71-2). Philosophical counsellors such as Ran Lahav back this up by suggesting that happiness or serenity is dependant upon a self-reflexive engagement with one's 'worldview' or personal system of beliefs and valuations (Lahav, 1995). In his provocatively titled book Plato not Prozac, Lou Marinoff goes so far as to endorse the words of Socrates who famously proclaimed that the unexamined life is not worth living (Marinoff, 1999, p. 11). If such commentators are to be believed, it is therefore perhaps credible that happiness is intrinsically linked to selfperception, apperception and a sense of valued being. I would suggest that this is becoming even more relevant in a material, consumer driven age which has loosened, if not severed its links to any spiritual dimension. Arguably our 'economistic' ideology, faltering as it is in the current economic downturn, has denigrated self-worth in the name of external avarice and profit margins. Education policy in the UK has been increasingly, if tacitly, complicit with this process of denigration; more and more, it has been directed towards economic ends (see for instance Alan Johnson's commitment to 'raising productivity' in the wake of the 'Leitch Report,' 2005). A significant by-product of this (perhaps necessary) economic focus has been what can be termed a 'narrowing of educational experiences' which has resulted in a 'sharply decreased ability [for education] to add to people's well-being' (Smith, 2005, p. 2). The coalition government's stringent cuts to funding in the post-sixteen sector in the UK will undoubtedly exacerbate the narrowing of the so-called 'educational experience' across the board.
However, it is my contention that both the academic and pastoral use of philosophy within the education system can have profound results with regard to what Donovan and Halpern term 'life satisfaction.' Unlike in France where the philosophy question in the International Baccalaureate makes the front page of the national newspapers, in the UK, the subject is, at least in some circles, still regarded as somewhat esoteric and marginal. In the present economic climate it is easy to equate that which is esoteric and marginal with that which is superfluous. Yet in an age shaped by the Nietzschean departure of God; an age of relative spiritual vacuity; an age wherein depression and unhappiness are on the increase, philosophy can play a significant role: such is my claim.
Let us flesh out this claim by asking ourselves what philosophy is. In general terms, philosophy questions and explores the big questions— the fundamentals of being and value. In this manner, it has the potential to shake one free from the experience of one's 'life forces' as an 'investment which must bring [...] the maximum profit obtainable under existing market conditions' (Forman quoted in Smith, 2005, p. 2). Otherwise put, philosophy can be regarded as a key 'life skill' that can enable one to reflect upon one's life and the lives of others within the broader community. Such reflection and apperception might not have any obvious economic value, yet it has the potential to increase self-worth, self-esteem and a sense of what it is to be; especially in a post-industrial world shaped by God's absence. As Alain de Botton puts it, it is philosophy that can 'explain our condition to us, and thereby help us to be less lonely with, and confused by it' (Botton, 2001, p. 199). But more than this, the academic study of philosophy can equip students with the essential 'life skill' of rational thought. Philosophy teaches the student to apply reason and logic to life—it enables the learner to think for themselves rather than passively consuming or buying into another's preordained path. Indeed, neophyte philosophy students are often surprised to find that there are (within certain basic academic parameters) no right or wrong answers. It often takes a subtle change of mental tack for them to fully realise that it is the analytic quality of their responses which is of primary importance. Another important way in which philosophy can increase 'life satisfaction' is in relation to ethics. Philosophy equips students with the skills needed to evaluate and critically reflect upon what is perceived to be right or wrong—what is deemed ethical and what is not. There is of course no universal consensus here; philosophy provides methodologies and perspectives, not answers or fundamentalist apertures. Of course, lurking within this positive openness is the spectre of a state of aporia (aporos—'impassable'). In short, as more answers are offered, more confusion manifests itself and compounds self-doubt. Otherwise stated, ignorance might well be the path to proverbial bliss. True as this might be in certain circumstances, I would however suggest that the mere discussion of such perspectives can enlighten the student as to their own ethical position and sense of value; it can bring a degree of clarity, albeit it a degree of clarity set squarely upon a subjective footing. In the most optimistic scenario, ethical philosophy can provide the student with decision-making procedures which can serve to ease evaluative doubt. In my experience as a sixth-form tutor, this has been particularly evident in classes engaged in debates centred upon the often emotive issue of practical ethics. The importance of providing students with the analytical and rational tools with which to grapple with subjects such as animal rights, euthanasia and abortion cannot be underestimated. Moreover, recently ethico-political philosophy has formed an analytical aperture through which many of my students have been able to interrogate the perceived rights and wrongs of civil disobedience set against the backdrop of the student tuition fees protests.
Aside from such life skills, I would also suggest that the teaching of philosophy can have a positive impact in terms of happiness in a slightly more tangential manner. Philosophy is largely a discursive subject; its telos is the truth or a sense of greater clarity within a dynamic framework that does not hold any one claim to truth as sacrosanct. In brief, philosophy can be construed as a dialogical subject—a subject that actively encourages an andragogical or self-directed approach to teaching as opposed to a didactic methodology which is, tacitly or otherwise, complicit in epistemic closure. As the personcentred therapist Carl Rogers once suggested, within such an educational approach, there is perhaps no comfort blanket of certainty, only an openness or a flowing out unto the Other (Rogers, 2004, p. 308). Such an approach does not provide the students with 'a rounded-out intellectual piece of merchandise which they [can] commit to memory and then give back' during an examination (Rogers, 2004, p. 307). At their best, philosophy classes are more open and permissive than many other areas of study. Within such a permissive environment, alienating didactic authority is jettisoned in the name of a facilitative approach designed to enable students to more freely explore the issues at hand and their genuine reactions to them. I would argue that philosophy is uniquely placed so as to encourage such an exploration—an exploration that is undoubtedly wedded to self-growth and knowledge.
Additionally, as Mark K. Smith has plausibly argued, happiness in education 'requires the possibility of easy access to counselling and pastoral provision so that those who are troubled have a means to come to an understanding of themselves and their situation' (Smith, 2005, p. 11). Again, I would argue that philosophy can play its part here. Philosophy can be utilised as an effective counselling tool—especially if the student has an elementary grounding in the subject. Peter Raabe adeptly summarises the use of philosophy within the therapeutic sphere when he suggests that 'philosophical counselling consists of a trained philosopher helping an individual deal with a problem or an issue that is of concern to that individual.' For Raabe, the philosophical counsellor/ tutor thus has a willingness to accept the challenge of taking philosophy out of the classroom and utilising it in the 'real' world of human interaction and exchange. Raabe makes it clear that the majority of students are capable of resolving their day-to-day problems by themselves or with the help of what he terms 'significant other.' However, sometimes such problems or dilemmas become too complex or composite, as in the case of conflicting values, for example, or career choices. As Raabe suggests, when values appear to conflict or one's own reasoning becomes ensnared within a circle, a trained philosopher has the potential to be a substantive helper (Raabe, 2006, p.1). Atrained philosopher is presumably an expert or specialist in such areas as ethics and reasoning. Hence, if a significant problem is a 'non-pathological problem in living' an empathetic philosopher will, perhaps, be well placed to bring some sense of clarity and resolution via dialogical interaction (LeBon, 2001, p. 9). As Lou Marinoff puts it with typical aplomb, what is needed here is congruent 'dialogue, not diagnosis' (Marinoff, 1999, p. 4). Thus through a combination of philosophical tuition and Philosophical Counselling (or pastoral Socratic discussion), resolution and increased happiness/well-being can perhaps be achieved. The skills used and developed within such congruent exchanges are transferable to the student's life after they leave full-time educational; to my mind they are key 'life skills' that are not driven by the myopic economic concerns Leitch et al prioritise.
The Dalai Lama once said that he believed that the very purpose of our lives is to seek happiness. As he put it, whether one believes in religion or not; whether one believes in this religion or that religion; isn't it the case that we are all seeking something better in life? Following this line of reasoning, he concluded that the very motion of our life is towards happiness (Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998, passim). As I have tentatively argued, within an educational setting, philosophy has the potential to play a significant part of such a motion towards happiness; or more generally, the motion towards well-being. Indeed, contrary to the findings of Donovan and Halpern, I would argue that a philosophical education can have a significant impact with regard to future 'life satisfaction' in a manner over-and-above the obsessive acquisition of economically productive skills. Perhaps, as Layard puts it, prioritising future economic productivity within the education system places students on a 'kind of hedonic treadmill' on which they have to keep running in order that their 'happiness stands still' (Layard, 2005, p. 48). Philosophy enables one to transcend such a stagnant state of active-stasis—a fact becoming ever more pertinent in the current global economic turmoil.
Bibliography
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Thompson, J. A. K., (trans.)(London: Penguin, 1976).
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Glasgow: Collins, 1962).
Dalai Lama & Cutler, H., The Art of Happiness: A Handbook for Living, (New York: Penguin Putman, 1998).
De Botton, A., The Consolations of Philosophy, (London: Penguin, 2001).
Donovan, N., and Halpern, D., (2002) 'Life Satisfaction: the State of Knowledge and Implications for Government': http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/paper%20pdf.ashx
Lahav, R., 'A Conceptual Framework for Philosophical Counselling: Worldview Interpretations,' in Lahav, R., and Tillmanns, M., (eds.) Essays on Philosophical Counselling, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995).
Layard, R., Happiness: Lessons for a New Science, (London: Penguin, 2005).
LeBon, T., Wise Therapy, (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2001).
Leitch, S., et al, (2005) 'Skills in the UK: The Long-term Challenge': http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr05_leitchreviewexecsummary_255.pdf
Marinoff, L., Plato Not Prozac: Applying Eternal Wisdom to Everyday Problems, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999).
Nodding, N., Happiness and Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Raabe, P., (2002) 'Professional Philosophy Outside the Academy: Philosophical Counselling': http://.philosophy.com/philosophy¬¬¬_article_14.html.
Raabe, P., (2006) 'What is Philosophical Counselling.': www.interchange.ubc.ca/raabe/what.html.
Rogers, C., On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy, (London: Constable, 2004).
Shah, H., and Marks, N., A Well-being Manifesto for a Flourishing Society, (New Economics Foundation, 2004): http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/z_sys_publicationdetail.aspx?pid=193
Smith, M. K., 'Happiness and Education – Theory, Practice and Possibility,' The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, (2005): http://www.infed.org/biblio/happiness_and_ education.html.
Return to vol. 10 no. 2 index page
This page was originally on the website of The Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies. It was transfered here following the closure of the Subject Centre at the end of 2011.
