DISKUS Vol.1 No.2 (1993) pp.55-65 Nicholas Sutton ISSUES ARISING FROM THE DISTINCTIONS DRAWN BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES One immediate question that arises in the mind of any outsider entering the field of the academic study of religion is why two separate disciplines should be required for the pursuit of such study. As might be expected the historical background provides some of the answers. The study of Theology has a long history, working through different ages to define the position of the Christian faith in relation to changing social environments. In the nineteenth century, despite the growth of secular and rationalist thought, the essential truth of the Christian revelation remained the predominant cultural orthodoxy and provided an important source of legitimation for colonial expansion. Non-Christian religions were studied from the perspective of Orientalism, which, as Sayeed has so eloquently argued, looked at other faiths only by way of comparison to the yardstick of religious truth - the Christian revelation. From this perspective non-Christian faiths were examined, sometimes with an admirable degree of rigour, only for the purpose of discovering the exact nature of their errors and the ways in which they were to be found wanting. The demise of the colonial era was marked by a reaction against Orientalism in its traditional form, to be replaced by the schools of Religious Studies now familiar in the modern universities. Freeing itself from the influence of Christian orthodoxy, the discipline of Religious Studies has sought in the past three or four decades to mark out for itself a new and radically different perspective from which to develop a more appropriate means of understanding non-Christian religions. This new perspective adopts a strictly neutral standpoint and confines itself to a phenomenological approach that allows descriptive analysis of religious traditions without recourse to any pre-ordained standard of reference, and hence allows each tradition to speak with its own voice unfettered by cultural interpretation. According to Ninian Smart, the discipline of Religious Studies must examine its subject from a position "outside the field", undertaking ". . . the attempt at value-free descriptions in religion". It differs from Theology in a functional sense, aiming at description rather than commendation. Theology meanwhile has watched the demise of its adjunct, Orientalism, with no great sense of loss. In the post-colonial era the supremacist assumptions implicit in Orientalism were outmoded, and, in the aftermath of the holocaust, had unwanted resonances of religious and racial intolerance. The discipline of Theology has continued its traditional role of defining and expanding the Christian perspective primarily from a position within the tradition of faith, quite happy to allow other religions to be understood in a purely phenomenological manner. Work towards a Christian understanding of other faiths has been pursued to some degree, perhaps the attempts of Rahner and Hick being the most notable, but many Christian theologians have sought refuge in the concept of cultural incommensurability in order to avoid being drawn into a problematical debate. The major problem faced by the discipline of Theology is how to define its role in terms of interaction with a predominantly secular society. The modern university is an avowedly secular institution and as such cannot allow any discipline to demand a commitment of faith from those who are to study within it. If Smart's assertion that Theology differs from Religious Studies in having the function of commendation is accepted, then the situation becomes problematical. A crucial question thus arises as to whether Theology's taking up a position "within the field" must entail a commitment of faith to the tradition it is working with. Here a distinction between studying and doing theology must be recognised. The former is a purely phenomenological activity, analysing and describing the theological arguments offered by a tradition, and can be pursued equally within the discipline of Religious Studies. Traditionally, however, the discipline of Theology has involved a degree of personal interaction with the material, and an impetus to do theology which, according to Lindbeck means "Christian self-description" and "laying out how the world looks from a Christian perspective". If the study of theology is to involve the personal interaction, the doing of theology, that distinguishes it from Religious Studies, then it appears that faith, or at least some form of commitment to the tradition is a prerequisite. Smart seems to confirm this view when he asserts that "the buddhologist is somehow to articulate Buddhist truth and insight just as the design of the Christian theologian is to articulate the Christian faith", and again, "A buddhologian needs to be a Buddhist". If this is the case then inevitably the discipline of Theology will be forced, following the lead set by Barth, to retreat into its own world largely abandoning interaction with the predominant academic and social environments. Recognising this danger, the American theologian David Tracy has presented the idea of a "public theology" through which the discipline may enter the debate over issues of public concern. In his first book, Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy argued that there are two types of theology, which he designated as Fundamental and Systematic. Fundamental theology involves a general exploration of beliefs and values without adherence to any particular creed or tradition, while Systematic Theology is the exploration of faith from within a tradition. In a later work, The Analytical Imagination, he takes the understanding of Systematic Theology a step further, opening it up to all people with an interest in beliefs, ideas and values. Here Systematic Theology is described as being any work that involves interpretation of or interaction with the great classics of religious belief. Such interaction is not confined to those who stand within the tradition of faith because the classic, "addresses great human questions in such a profound way that it speaks to an audience far beyond the particular community that produced it." Thus anyone can partake of a personal dialogue with a text such as the Bible, regardless of his or her own beliefs, through reflection on the wisdom it conveys, and thus anyone is able to do theology as well as to study it. Thus although Smart may feel that theology must come from within a tradition, Tracy is here presenting an alternative view, and it is one that is shared by other theologians. According to Schubert Ogden, "the personal faith of the theologian is not necessary for his or her theological understanding", while Gordon Kaufmann asserts that "reflection on the ultimate point of reference for all life and thought and reality must surely go on in some form so long as human life persists". If the view of these writers is accepted then it is apparent that a commitment of faith is not a prerequisite for either the study or the doing of theology. Up to this point then it has been noted that the contemporary distinction between the disciplines of Theology and Religious Studies is based upon perspective, approach and methodology. Religious Studies involves descriptive phenomenology from a position of neutrality, while Theology allows, and at times demands, interaction and personal dialogue with the subject matter, though without the necessity of asserting a definite position within a tradition of faith. This, I feel, is a reasonable response to the puzzled outsider in presenting a theoretical distinction, but the question must be raised as to whether the reality of the situation matches the theory. It is apparent that in actuality the distinction between the academic disciplines is drawn along two axes and not one, as our discussion of theory would suggest. The reasons for this lie in the historical antecedents sketched out above. The methodology of Religious Studies arose as a reaction to Orientalism, and as such has been applied primarily to non-Christian religions. Writing in 1977 Ninian Smart argued that ". . . there is a growing recognition that the methods and ideas which have been used fruitfully in the study of other religions and in anthropology can be applied to Christianity itself." Whilst it is to be acknowledged that there has been some movement in this direction, the general picture remains the same as that implied here by Smart, with the study of the Christian tradition being left to the domain of Theology with its own approach, whilst Theology has discarded Orientalism and allowed the study of non-Christian faiths to take place under the aegis of Religious Studies. Within the field of Theology, the meaning of the existence of other faiths is explored, but this amounts to no more than the attempt of the Christian to understand why other faiths exist and how they are to be understood in light of the Christian revelation. It is hence about Christianity, not the non-Christian faiths. It is also true that a student undertaking a degree in Theology may be allowed to study non-Christian religions, but where this is the case a switch to the methodology of Religious Studies is employed with a very apparent change of approach. Hence we find that in reality the distinction between Religious Studies and Theology is not just one of perspective, but also of subject matter. There are two distinct methods of study, the interactive and the neutral, and two distinct subject matters, the Christian and the non-Christian religions. The interactive method is generally applied to Christianity, and the neutral approach to non-Christian religions, but this situation would appear to be conventional rather than theoretical. If, as Tracy, Kaufmann, and Ogden urge, no commitment of faith is to be demanded for the study of Theology, then there would seem to be no reason at all why the different approaches should not be applied to the alternative subject matters. This potential has been recognised by some scholars. Mircea Eliade laments, "It seems to me difficult to believe that, living in a historical moment, like ours, the historians of religions will not talk again about the creative possibilities of their discipline," and that the spiritual universes of Africa and Asia, ". . . will be reduced to facts about social organisations, economic regimes, epochs of precolonial and colonial history etc." In her book, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, it is interesting to note how Wendy O'Flaherty takes the question of theodicy, the problem of reconciling God's omnipotence and goodness with a world of misery, and looks to the Hindu tradition for solutions in a manner very close to that adopted by Christian theologians in working interactively with their own scriptural canon. Similarly the neutral stance of Religious Studies has been shown to offer valuable insights when applied to the study of Christianity. Eisenmann, in his recent work on the Qumran scrolls, has demonstrated effectively that the fact that such a perspective has not previously been brought to bear on this material has done much to obscure their true significance. It is clear from the passage cited above that Smart recognises the value of studying Christianity from a Religious Studies perspective, though it is doubtful as to how far he would welcome any instrusion of the interactive approach of Theology into the study of non-Christian religions. It must be stressed that all such discussion is in no way intended to invalidate the current status of the two disciplines. It merely raises the question as to whether there might be some gaps in the field and suggest ways in which they may be filled. To my mind it is very apparent that both approaches to the study of religion have much to recommend them. If the perspective and methodology currently employed in the discipline of Theology be allowed application in the study of non-Christian faiths, then clearly there is the possibility of pushing beyond the limitations Eliade is referring to. Whilst we frequently read one writer in the field of Religious Studies referring to the work of a colleague as `important' or `significant', it is understood that such terms can only be deemed appropriate within the rather narrow parameters of the discipline. As long as it confines itself to purely phenomenological conclusions without projecting the significance of its object of study into the contemporary world, then the significance of the contribution of the study of religion to contemporary issues will be curtailed. Smart argues that Religious Studies provides a basis of understanding from which one who aspires to do so may go forward to interact with a tradition, but, whilst his point is well taken, it must be noted that there is a wide gap between providing a basis and actually undertaking an endeavour. The assertion of the German theologian, Hans-Georg Godamer that "Taking a voice out of the past seriously provides a useful way of challenging the assumptions of the present," is one that demands serious consideration, and it may be argued that in refusing to test the challenges of such voices from non-Christian traditions against modern assumptions, Religious Studies is not doing full justice to the traditions it works with. Applying the perspective from outside the field to Christian studies provides an obvious counter to the mass of literature from within the tradition. I am well-aware of the post-modernist critique that reduces the rational and positivist perspective from an absolute to a relative status. I also have serious misgivings as to whether there is in reality any such thing as a neutral position that is truly "outside the field". Nonetheless, the rationalist view remains a perspective of vital importance, especially in our culture. To allow its entrance into the study of Christianity, as indeed is becoming increasingly the case, is essential if the study of Theology is to be able to sustain any form of meaningful dialogue with other disciplines, and not retreat into its own private world along the lines that the diehards of neo-orthodoxy would prescribe for it. It must also be demanded that intellectual integrity be maintained in as much as writers should come clean about the position from which they are working. Too often we find polemicists disguising themselves behind the methodology of Religious Studies in order to make it appear that their arguments are based on rational assessment rather than their own personal commitment of faith. Here I am referring to works such as Avat ra and Incarnation by Geoffrey Parrinder which works on an apparently phenomenological basis until the last few chapters, and only then is the true agenda revealed as the author lays stress on the supremacy of the Christian revelation in a slightly revamped `hidden Christ of Hinduism' theology of other religions. Thus far I have argued that the study of non-Christian religions might be enhanced by allowing at least some entry of the interactive method of approach that is conventional in the study of Christianity, and also that the perspective of Religious Studies could expand our understanding of the Christian tradition. Now taking the argument a step further, I would urge that despite the demise of Orientalism, the fact that a methodology that is not purely descriptive is allowed only in the study of Christianity betrays a continuing bias in our appreciation of the world religions even in the apparently secular institutions of the modern universities. Why else, and here I am concerned with theory rather than practicality, should it be allowed that Christianity may be explored in a manner that allows personal dialogue with the tradition, while such practice is excluded from our endeavours to comprehend non-Christian faiths. It would appear that in being forced to demand a position outside the field, Religious Studies may still be allowing its agenda to be set by reference to Christianity. The recourse to a strictly phenomenological approach is clearly a reaction to Christian dominance of the study of religion, and hence is not truly independent of that dominance. A comparison may be drawn here with the ending of colonialism, which dismantled formal imperial structures, but did little to end the dominance of the western nations over their former colonial empires. Thus it may be argued that if full justice is to be done to the integrity of non-Christian religions, then the mode of study undertaken within academic disciplines should not differ to any radical degree from that applied to the study of Christianity. A further factor that must be taken into account in this debate is that of dialogue between religions. Where two distinct approaches are employed in the study of Christian and non-Christian faiths, then clearly the potential for meaningful dialogue will be curtailed, for the understanding that develops will be along different lines and from different perspectives. Anyone who moves between the disciplines of Religious Studies and Theology cannot fail to note the lack of congruence. Different authorities are cited in the establishment of methodologies of study, leading to a very different appreciation and understanding of the nature of religion. I noted earlier Wendy O'Flaherty's work on Hindu theodicy as one that employed an approach to a non-Christian tradition somewhat akin to that often used in Christian studies. From her introduction it is clear that she recognises the potential for expanding dialogue by approaching the subject from this perspective, "Indeed, it is my fondest wish that the present work may provide raw material for a single facet - the Hindu facet - of just such a cross-cultural analysis, perhaps used in conjunction with such studies of the Western approach to the problem of evil as the works of John Bowker, John Hick, C.G. Jung, C.S. Lewis and Paul Ricoeur." The principal objection to any attempt to work with non-Christian religions in a manner similar to that through which Theology approaches Christianity is that such an approach is substantially culturally specific. Theology has developed its modus operandi entirely within a Christian context, and if it be transferred in any way to a non-Christian tradition then inevitably the subject will be addressed from a position that imposes alien assumptions, attempting to force round pegs into square holes, and ignoring the issues that the tradition is actually reflecting upon. In reply to this I would urge that religions respond to human experience by providing answers to the questions which that experience gives rise to. Undoubtedly some human experience is culturally specific, but the more profound questions arise from the realities faced by all humanity in common. On this basis I would argue that the questions that the major religions of the world confront are very often essentially the same, though the terminology, the means of expression, and the answers provided may differ radically. This issue was specifically addressed by Julius Lipner in the 1991 Cadbury Lectures delivered at the University of Birmingham. In stressing the importance of meaningful dialogue between faiths he overruled the objection of cultural incommensurability by stressing the commonality of human experience. If this view is accepted then it is apparent that there is no real substance to the objection outlined above to the application of the interactive approach conventionally employed in the study of Christianity to the study of non-Christian religions. Again I would draw attention to O'Flaherty's work at the beginning of which she cites the views of Herman, Watts and other Indologists to the effect that in Hindu thought the problem of theodicy does not arise. Her close examination of the myths of the Hindu scriptures reveals, however, that what to the western mind might appear as no more than bizarre fables are in fact attempts at grappling with the same problem of reconciling divine omnipotence with divine goodness that has vexed western theologians down the centuries, and offer solutions that make a valuable contribution to the debate. The argument against dialogue of this type on the basis of cultural incommensurability is an interesting one. It amounts to a refusal to comment on the validity of other revelations on the basis that each culture amounts to virtually a separate reality that can be referred to only on its own terms of reference. This may sound a reasonable view, and certainly more acceptable than traditional assertions of Christian supremacy. To my mind, however, there appears to be an underlying agenda that has more to do with avoiding the issue than religious tolerance. A theology of other religions must ultimately allow either that Christianity is one revelation among many, or else reaffirm the traditional supremacist view, even if it be watered down to the "hidden Christ of Hinduism" idea. Today, overt western supremacism is an unpopular standpoint to adopt, with its resonances of the holocaust, slavery, colonial empires, massacres of native populations, and other great evils of recent history. Still, however, many Christian thinkers are reluctant to abandon their claims to a unique revelation, which are inherently supremacist, and thus fall back on ideas of incommensurability to avoid a difficult issue. It may be that I am being overly cynical here, and doing an injustice to those who deserve to be thought better of, but my suspicion is that arguments in favour of incommensurability should be viewed with some caution. My basic argument, asides apart, has been that there is no theoretical reason why radically different approaches should be adopted in the study of Christian and non- Christian religions. The work of Wendy O'Flaherty has impressed me as to the possibilities that may be opened up when the conventional boundaries are relaxed. She has taken a particular topic of theological consideration - evil and theodicy - and shown the insights that the whole Hindu tradition has brought to bear in this area. My own current field of research differs from this approach in taking one particular text - the Hindu epic, the Mah bh rata - and attempting to establish the answers it offers to a range of theological questions. Western studies of the Mah bh rata classified the work as an `epic' and initially tried to understand it from a text and historical critical perspective, an approach exemplified by Hopkins' The Great Epic of India. A more recent trend, following the lead set by Winternitz and Dum‚zil, seeks to discover the symbolic and mythic significance that lies behind the epic narrative. Here the work of Alf Hiltebeitel and Mad‚leine Biardeau is perhaps the most prominent. Whilst recognising the value of such studies, and indeed making use of their findings, I have tried to view the Mah bh rata in a manner perhaps more common to the study of Theology by accepting the work as primarily a religious scripture which seeks through both narrative and didactic modes to provide answers to the fundamental questions that human existence raises. Again I must stress that I am not urging that this is necessarily the correct or even the best way to approach religious literature, merely that it provides a perspective that adds to an all-round appreciation of the text and the tradition it speaks from. In its favour I would, however, argue that it has the merit of coming closer to the view of the text defined for it by the original authors, who make it clear in their introductory passages that the Mah bh rata is a work that expounds spiritual truth as a guide to humanity. Thus to treat the work as a scripture must go some way towards doing justice to its own perception of itself. Having opted to view the text in this way, the first task has been to provide some historical context. By this I mean attempting to establish at least the idea of the sitz im leben from which the text emerged, in terms of earlier works from which its teachings are to some extent derived, and the position of religious orthodoxy in relation to the newly arisen heretical sects such as the Buddhists, Jains and Aj vikas. Perhaps the most difficult task is to determine which questions should be addressed to the text, and the manner in which they may be expressed, for they must be broad enough to allow it to speak with its own voice, and yet specific enough to retain their identity as genuine doctrinal inquiry. In addition it is important not only to recognise the answers the text delivers, but also to note the degree to which it is preoccupied with a particular question. Based on this understanding, I have sought to establish the perspectives the Mah bh rata brings to bear on questions such as salvation, the nature of the Deity, the authority of scripture, the authority of religious orthodoxy, the nature of creation, and of man, ethics, free will and destiny, and gender roles. Such headings are, I believe, sufficiently broad to allow the text to speak without external imposition. From these starting points research into the doctrines of the Mah bh rata can be pursued with thoroughness without any need, and this is important, of having to refer back to any external point of reference. The merit of this method of approach seems to me to lie in its allowing the text to speak for itself, without extensive interpretation, and at the same time deliver a message that has relevance beyond the cultural environment from which it came. If the argument in favour of cultural incommensurability is allowed to predominate the significance of the ideas of the Mah bh rata is undermined, but it is surely apparent that teachings and doctrines can surmount cultural barriers in a way that is truly meaningful. If that is not the case then how can Paul, Isaiah, or Mohammed speak to us from cultures so far removed from contemporary life? In addition I have attempted to take this approach a step further by reflecting on how the teachings of the text may contribute to consideration of contemporary issues and values in a manner that is often referred to as the actualisation of a doctrine. Here I am looking for ways in which the work under consideration is able to interact with and critique the modern ideologies on which our lives, values, and culture are based, or, as Tracy urges, finding ways in which, "it may speak to an audience far beyond the particular community that produced it." To do this, it is my contention, one does not need to be a theologian with a commitment of faith to the Hindu tradition, nor does one need to transgress the non-polemical integrity of the discipline of Religious Studies. Opening up the study of religion in the ways suggested above may, however, allow some of the more stimulating aspects of the conventional study of Theology to permeate into the study of non-Christian traditions. Finally I must stress that what I have outlined above is in no way to be taken as a criticism or rejection of other perspectives and approaches that aim to increase our comprehension of other religions. There is, I feel, little value in the tedious gainsaying of alternative views that academia too readily falls into, and which is such a tempting path to follow in any research. My only quarrel is with those who indulge in intellectual dishonesty for polemical purposes. What I have presented is far from dogmatic and no more than a questioning based on some of the issues I have encountered in pursuing research into religion; my hope is that it may stimulate further reflection.