DISKUS Vol. 5 (1999)
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb11/religionswissenschaft/journal/diskus

THE SOCIAL ENGINEERING OF CULTURE AND RELIGION IN SINGAPORE
Andreas Ackermann

Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut
Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities
Goethestrasse 31
D-45128 Essen, Germany

http://www.kwi-nrw.de
Email: andreas.ackermann@kwi-nrw.de

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Abstract
This article analyses the state management of ethnic and religious identity through official multiculturalism in Singapore. The government's deliberate attempt to filter out folk beliefs and practices in order to 'tidy up' religion is discussed with special reference to the religious knowledge courses in school.
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     Reading the Straits Times, the Singaporean daily newspaper, on January 6 1998, one could find the following about Hari Raya, the end of the Muslim fasting month:

"... when Minister without Portfolio Lim Boon Heng switches on the lights on January 11 at the Malay Village, it will be scores of 4-metre-high giant emblems of Islam such as the star and crescent that will light up. (...) The light-up will have a theme, Harmonious Family, for the first time." (Straits Times Interactive, 06.01.1998 - http://straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/stsin11.html)

The same issue tells us also where to get the tickets needed to take part in the procession at the Hindu festival of Thaipusam. On this occasion milk pots will be carried upon special frames called kavadis along a fixed route through town. So, "in order to ease congestion, tickets will be sold according to time slots, which devotees may choose" (Straits Times Interactive, 06.01.1998 - http://straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/sthot17.html). A few weeks later the reader is informed that the burning of giant joss sticks and candles used at Chinese religious and funeral ceremonies will be banned, in order to "minimise pollution and public inconvenience". Therefore, from March 1 Joss sticks cannot be more than 2 m in length and 7.5 cm in diameter; and at each location, no more than six joss sticks may be burnt at one time. Candles cannot be longer than 60 cm and only two can be burnt at one time. Joss sticks and candles cannot be burnt within 30 m of any building. (Straits Times Interactive, 16.02.1998 - http://straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/stsin1.html)

These newspaper clippings highlight two relevant points about culture and religion in Singapore (apart from the widely known fact that it is certainly a clean and orderly place): first, it is a multiethnic and multireligious society, and second, the state strictly controls the public display of ethnic as well as religious identity. With Muller (1987) I define identity as the expression of coherence with groups. It is socially constructed rather than stemming from cultural "givens". The members of a group stress their "sameness" by identifying themselves with characteristic qualities. The notion of group means that its members have something in common with each other, which distinguishes them in a significant way from the members of other putative groups. Group identity thus refers simultaneously to both similarity and difference. The word expresses a relational idea: the opposition of one group to others or to other social entities. Because the use of the word "group" expresses a distinction, it seems appropriate to focus on boundaries rather than the cultural traditions they supposedly preserve. In the following I will try to give a very brief account of the government's 'social engineering' attitude towards ethnic and religious boundaries in Singapore.<1>

Both ethnicity and religion have always played an important role in the history of Singapore. For almost 150 years of British colonial rule (1819-1963) the city was a typical plural society, characterized by different ethnic groups which live side by side, but separately, whereby each group holds "its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways" (Furnivall 1948, 304). From the beginning, Raffles - the "founder" of Singapore - had promoted the residential separation of ethnic groups, traces of which remain in the present city landscape with its "Chinatown", "Little India" and "Geylang Serai".<2> One major change after the split with the Federation of Malaysia and the subsequent independence in 1965 was the incorporation of multicultural elements into the former plural society. Up to that time something like "the Singaporean" had been an unknown entity, as it had always been part of a larger colonial structure: first of the Straits Settlements, later a Crown Colony and finally a part of the Federation of Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister, himself admitted that the idea of an independent Singapore then was a "political, economic and geographical absurdity" (Willmott 1989, 585). Consequently, the government considered the construction of a collective identity integrating the various communities as one of its major tasks. Instead of trying to assimilate the ethnic minorities into the Chinese majority, or to create a "melting pot", the government pursued a strategy that ensured cultural distinctiveness among the various ethnic groups. The Singaporean national identity therefore has two components, a national and an ethnic.<3>


Singapore's politics of multiculturalism

The political recognition of Singapore as a multiethnic society relegated ethnic (and religious) considerations to the realm of the private and voluntary. The management of ethnic identity by the state involved the attempt to restructure the respective ethnic identities. The basic elements of the Singaporean nation-building policy have been subsumed under the so-called "four M's" (Siddique 1990), which stand for the principles of multiracialism, multilingualism, multiculturalism and multireligiosity. They are the deliberate attempt to dissolve the ethnic, religious and linguistic heterogeneity of the island's population into clear-cut, manageable categories. The principle of multiracialism puts the rather heterogeneous ethnic and cultural character of the various communities into four officially categorized "races", Chinese, Malay, Indian, and "Others" (CMIO).<4> The latter is a residual category for all those not belonging to the first three, consisting of communities as diverse as "Eurasian"<5>, Filipino, Armenian, Jewish, Arab, people of "Caucasian descent" (i.e. North Americans and Europeans), and Japanese. The basic principle of multiracialism - often referred to as meritocracy - is to treat all the various communities equally in respect of citizenship and before the law. Only Muslims are allowed their own system of religious customary law in family and matrimonial cases (Clammer 1988, 99). According to the official categories, Singapore's population of 3.1 million comprised in 1997 77.2% Chinese, 14.1% Malays, 7.4% Indians and 1.3% "Others" (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998).

The principle of multiculturalism assumes that each "race" has a distinct culture which is perpetuated by its own language. Thus, the principle of multilingualism - although it would be better to speak of bilingualism - links a so-called "mother tongue" to each of the respective "races". The official languages are Malay, Chinese (Mandarin), Tamil and English.<6> Malay is the national language (being used in the military and the national anthem) and English the language of administration. Where English, the principal language of education, has become the lingua franca for inter-ethnic communication as well as a medium of international communication, the "mother tongue" is supposed to transport the distinct culture of each ethnic group. By providing the so-called "cultural ballast" it plays an important role in Singapore's multicultural politics.

The politics of multiculturalism with its constant reference to culture as "traditional" and "ethnic" puts considerable pressure on people to identify themselves within the confines of supposedly pure ethnic categories. Although inter-ethnic marriages are registered as such, there are no inter-ethnic individuals in Singapore even when they are the offspring of such a marriage. Children of mixed marriages become administratively assimilated to the "race" and dialect category of one of the parents, usually the father. Giving an identity card to all citizens at the age of twelve finally confirms this categorization by recording his or her "race", religion, thumb print, address, identification number and blood type. Hence every Singaporean "is deeply aware that he or she is a member of a "race", speaks a particular language, believes in a particular religion, and is simultaneously cognizant of others, who are similar and dissimilar to him/her" (Lim 1993, 37). The heterogeneity within each ethnic community is subsumed in public discourse under an imagined homogeneous community with apparently rigid boundaries and markers.<7>

The official policy of the state with regard to religion has been to remain secular while at the same time advocating multireligiosity, that is, guaranteeing freedom of worship and equal treatment of all religions. All the major religious festivals are public holidays; for example New Year's Day, Good Friday and Christmas for the Christians, Chinese New Year for the Chinese religionists, Hari Raya Puasa and Hari Raya Haji for the Muslims, Vesak Day for the Buddhists, and Deepavali for the Hindus. Similar to the homogenization of culture, language and race, the official multicultural policies tends to insinuate an intertwining of race and religion, where the Chinese are either Taoists or Buddhists, the Malays Muslims, and the Indians Hindus. The 1995 General Household Survey found the main practised religion to be "Chinese Religion" (comprising Buddhism and Taoism), constituting about 53.8 per cent of the total population. 14.9 per cent of the Singaporeans identified themselves as Muslims (86.3 per cent Malays) and 3.3 per cent as Hindus (mostly Indians)<8>. Of the rest, 12.9 per cent are Christians (88.9 per cent Chinese) 0.6 per cent other religions (e.g. Judaism, Zoroastrianism) and 14.5 per cent claim to have no religion (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998).

The principle of multireligiosity has resulted in a rather peaceful coexistence of the various religious communities, in the public as well as in the private sphere of life. It is not an uncommon sight to have a church, a mosque and a temple built close together or to find a prominent Hindu temple in Chinatown (Nagore Durgha Shrine). Similarly, in the integrated public housing estates, which accommodate more than 85 per cent of the population, followers of the various religious practices live together on the same floor. As the floor is used by many residents for the display of ethnic as well as religious markers, this means coping with those religious practices considered physically or ritually polluting. Hence residents of different faiths try to abstain from the discussion and comparison of religious differences and, instead stress that, "after all, we have to share the same corridor".<9>


From "Religious Knowledge" to "Shared Values": Recent Trends in Singapore's Management of Religion

It is interesting to note that in contrast to its previous policy of relegating religious and cultural considerations to the private sphere, the government changed its strategy during the 1980s, when it brought ethnic and religious considerations to the fore.<10> By the beginning of the 1980's, the government felt that the economic growth in Singapore had intensified a consumerist orientation with greater emphasis on the individual among the population. This, it was feared in a report of the Ministry of Education 1978, could lead to the loss of "the traditional values of one's people and the acquisition of the more spurious fashions of the West". One ideological response was the attempt to inculcate Asian values into Singaporean society so as to prevent the spread of Western individualism. This move was directed particularly at the Chinese, who were seen to be most at risk. There have been sustained campaigns, beginning in 1978 and 1982 respectively, to promote Confucian values and the Mandarin language. Both campaigns have been implemented through changes in the school curriculum and through media advertising. "Chineseness" is portrayed as a traditional culture encapsulated in Confucianism and Mandarin, which embodies the values of discipline, respect for authority and commitment to the community.<11>

The government had laid the foundations for the promotion of Asian values in schools in 1982, when the Ministry of Education proposed the teaching of Religious Knowledge (later renamed Moral Education) as a compulsory subject, with students of each racial category studying their respective religion. Five religious subjects were offered: Bible knowledge, Buddhist studies, Hindu studies, Islamic religious knowledge and World religions - with Confucian Ethics for those Chinese not religiously inclined. The development of curriculum material for the six different options exemplifies one aspect of the broader phenomenon of a "rationalization of religion" (Tong 1992) in Singapore, which goes alongside with the reengineering of ethnicity. The term rationalization can be attributed to two developments: A major shift in religious affiliations of Singaporeans can be noted, where Christianity and Buddhism have increased their numbers of followers, while the traditional Chinese religions (in the Singaporean context mainly referred to as "Taoism") have lost a substantial number of worshippers. To this aspect I will return in the next section.


From Religious Knowledge to Moral Education

First, I want to demonstrate the other aspect of religious rationalization in Singapore, i.e. the official attempt to filter out folk beliefs and practices in order to 'tidy up' religion. The case of the religion curriculum gives a good example of the domestication of the less manageable elements in the religious traditions: a clear distinction was made between the cognitive component of religion - religious knowledge - on which the curriculum would be based, and what was called "religious instruction", including such practices as prayer, meditation, and worship, which were proscribed. The Buddhist Studies program, for example, was geared towards the production of secular social and moral values. Only those Buddhist values which were of direct relevance to the stated aims of the Ministry of Education were highlighted and given a practical redefinition to suit the secular context. Thus, the teachings of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path were the two main aspects incorporated into the textbooks. Originally, the Four Noble Truths explain the cause of suffering and the Eightfold Path directs the way out of it, but within the context of moral education, they were translated into values such as self-reliance, tolerance, loving-kindness, and compassion. Besides, the textbooks treated ritualism, which constitutes an important element of Buddhist culture, in a negative manner. Furthermore, they derided ostentatious displays of religious paraphernalia and discouraged the practice of spirit-mediumship and animistic folk practices by calling these "superstition" (Kuah 1991, 33-34).

The state's deployment of religion as a sustainer of shared social values had three important consequences: First, the state defined what is acceptable religion. Second, all religions were pressured to adjust to the state ideology, which means, for example, a capitalist basis of the economy, a tolerant stance towards other religions and the acceptance of democratic values. Third, it homogenized religion by permitting interreligious differences only if they complement each other (Hill/Lian 1995, 205). Within a few years, however, it was argued that this might have contributed to a religious revivalism affecting Christianity, Buddhism and Islam in particular, which allegedly threatened ethnic harmony. However, a revived interest in religious matters can be found within Hinduism as well, as was related to me by an interview partner:

"...if you ask me, it has got more important in recent times (...) there is a more conscious attempt, which I can see, about observing traditions and religious festivals. (...) And kids now, like my nephew and my nieces, they are into all this things, when, at their age, I wasn't, you know? They are more concerned about festivals and can explain to me traditions and why this should be done in this way, and why should they go, you know, they go to the temple more really than me! I mean, and you can see in the generation that's growing up, it is a revival. (Viva) <12>

The findings of a government-commissioned "Report on Religion and Religious Revivalism in Singapore" implicated Religious Knowledge courses in intensifying religious fervour and religious differences among students, and possibly in the long term, contributing to inter-religious conflicts (Kuo/Quah/Tong, 1988). As a result, the teaching of Religious Knowledge was abandoned in 1990 in favour of Civics, described by the Minister of Education as "aspects of nation-building, awareness of shared values and an appreciation of Singapore's major religions and races" (Straits Times 07.10.1989).


From superstition to systematization and rationalization

Another important outcome of the report was the analysis of changes in the Singaporean religious landscape. Over the past thirty years, in accordance with rapid social change, the religious composition of the population in Singapore has changed significantly. Shifts in religious affiliations have occurred, and are continuing, most prominently among Christianity and the Chinese religions.<13> There has been a substantial increase in the number of Christians in Singapore (especially among the Protestant charismatic and revivalist movements) from 2 per cent in 1921 to almost 13 per cent in 1995, while Chinese religions face a decline from 98 per cent in 1921 to about 54 per cent in 1995. One substantial factor in the increasing popularity of Christianity seems to be a general dissatisfaction among young Chinese Singaporeans with their parents' religious practices which they perceive as "illogical, unrealistic and superstitious". Christianity in contrast is considered to be ethnically neutral, unlike Islam and Hinduism. It represents Western influence and is associated with modernization and the English language. Christianity is therefore supposed to be "rational, orderly and systematic". As one of my interview partners put it:

"Perhaps religion was strong during our grandparents' or great-grandparents' time, but then, as people became more modern, they sort of did away with the traditional religious stuff, you know. It's superstitious and all that, so when people get a bit more educated, they tend to be more wary of this kind of things, more cynical, and so they break away, you see? And, I guess, a large part of them either become freethinkers, or they go to something which seems to them more logical, you see, and more real and less superstitious. That's why it seems that we're sort of, abandoning our traditional stuff." (Denise)

Unlike the traditional Chinese religions, Buddhism has evidently been able to retain its followers and, in a sense, is being revived. It seems that many perceive Buddhism, like Christianity, to be a systematic, logical and relevant religion. It is interesting to note however, that "Taoism" reacted to its loss of membership by the formation of the Singapore Taoist Federation, whose explicit aim is to educate and unite Taoists in Singapore. This constitutes an attempt to develop an organizational structure that will be able to meet the challenges from other religious traditions. This attempt at a systematization and rationalization of traditional Chinese religion can be further exemplified in the production of a handbook on Chinese Customs and Festivals in Singapore. Its foreword makes "the sheer number of Chinese customs and rituals that are observed" responsible for "the growing apathy among the young Singaporeans":

"In the bewildering mass of traditional practices wherein fact is not easy to distinguish from fiction, the young Singaporeans are likely to discard Chinese rituals in toto. We believe that the most effective way to counter this tendency is to select and simplify the essential customs and festivals." (Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations 1989, 7)

The authors go on to say that because Chinese rituals were formulated and practised by a largely agrarian society, it would be understandable "that many of them may seem irrelevant in a modern urban society like Singapore". It follows that "Blind observation has no place in a highly educated nation like Singapore". Therefore, the handbook has been designed to make Chinese customs and rituals "more relevant to the Singapore society". For example, in the section on the Dragon Boat Festival it is suggested that "Singaporeans should use the occasion to remember those patriotic Singaporeans who have contributed and died for the country". The authors conclude with the hope that their handbook will revive interest in Chinese practices, whose preservation is crucial to social stability and cohesion because these traditional practices reflect the basic Chinese virtues of loyalty, filial piety, humanism and righteousness. These are moral values that hold a nation together and help ensure a stable and peaceful society. (Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations 1989, 9)

These religious changes have, in part, to do with social structural changes: urbanization, English-medium education, and higher standards of living. They result in an intertwining of social class and religion, where lower socio-economic status Chinese tend to be among the Taoists, while upper socio-economic Chinese tend to be among the Christians (Tong 1992, 294). The Protestant charismatic and revivalist movements especially seem to draw followers from the increasing number of English-educated Chinese. The report speaks in this respect of "the increased fervent and zealous work" that is put into Christian activities and warns:

"Given the strong sentimental appeal of a religion to its followers and their (religious) community, the shifting trends in recent years, both in the size of membership and in changing attitudes and activities, may threaten to disrupt the subtle and delicate equilibrium which has characterized the religious scene in Singapore for decades." (Kuo/Quah/Tong 1988, 2)

In addition to the termination of Religious Knowledge, a "Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill" was passed in 1990 which threatened sanctions against religious leaders who commented on social and political issues in their capacity as preachers. This constituted an attempt to distinguish the promotion of religion as a unifying cultural anchor from the subversive promotion of divisive religious values. Thus, the parliament adopted on 15 January 1993 the nation's so-called "Shared Values", which are: (1) Nation before community and society above self; (2) Family as the basic unit of society; (3) Community support and respect for the individual; (4) Consensus, not conflict; and (5) Racial and religious harmony. Since then, the government has changed its strategy from referring to values based on the various religions or cultures in Singapore to promoting shared national values for all Singaporeans.<14> It remains to be seen if the officially designated ethnic and religious categories in Singapore continue to be a stabilizing factor rather than a starting point for future conflicts. The possible outcome will mostly depend on the government's management of ethnic and religious identities, and in particular its emphasis on similarities instead of differences.



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Notes

<1> For a more detailed account of multiculturalism in Singapore, please refer to Ackermann (1997), a comparative study on multiculturalism in Singapore and Frankfurt am Main. Ethnographic data in Singapore was collected through qualitative, in-depth interviews and participant observation as Visiting Associate of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) from October 1992 to the end of April 1993.
<2> On the history of Singapore, see for example Turnbull (1989) and Chew/Lee (1991).
<3> Chua (1995) and Hill/Lian (1995) give detailed accounts of the nationbuilding process in Singapore.
<4> Ironically, the CMIO labels are a product of colonial administration, as the British had classified the immigrants according to their nationalities for the division of labour and the planning of residential quarters. They shall be used from now on without inverted commas, on the understanding that these labels should not be taken as self-evident analytical, but rather as conceptual categories.
<5> The Eurasian Association constitution defines an Eurasian as a person "whose father or any of whose male progenitors in the male line is or was of European descent and whose name is etymologically European" (Braga-Blake 1992, 11).
<6> Of course, there are many more languages spoken within the Chinese and Indian communities in Singapore. Main Chinese dialects are Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese and Foochow. Besides Tamil, some of the other languages spoken by Indians are Malayalam, Punjabi, Telegu, Hindi and Bengali.
<7> Yet, there are at least two traditionally "mixed" communities in Singapore that have been established for a long time, the Babas and the Eurasians. The Babas or Straits (-born) Chinese, also Peranakan, are a unique blend of Chinese "ethnic" and Malay "cultural" traits. Since their immigration preceded most other groups they can be said to represent the "real" cultural heritage of Singapore (Cf. Rudolph 1998). Similarly, Eurasians could be regarded as typical Singaporean in the original sense, because they combine European and Asian cultural influences, hence they are not "pure" but "mixed" in all respects (Cf. Braga-Blake 1992). Both communities vanish, however, under the Chinese and "Others" category, respectively.
<8> Recently, the Straits Times reported that "there are an estimated 40,000 Indian Muslims in Singapore" (Straits Times Interactive, 26.11.1998 - http://straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/sin18_1126.html).
<9> For more information refer to Ackermann (1997, chapter 3), where I give a detailed analysis of a "neighbourliness that tolerates".
<10> For lack of space, the following touches upon the religious aspect only. For the ethnic aspect, for example the question of Malay/Muslim loyalty to the state and ethnic self-help organizations, refer to Ackermann (1997, chapter 2.3).
<11> For the campaign to promote Confucianism, see Chua (1992 & 1995, chapter 7); for the Speak Mandarin campaign, refer to Newman (1986), Ng (1980) and Kuo (1984).
<12> The informants' names throughout the text are pseudonyms.
<13> In this context it is interesting to note that of eighteen Singaporeans interviewed by the author, four had converted their religion.
<14> Interesting questions about these values - from definitions of each term to empirical evidence of the extent to which they are shared - are raised by Clammer (1993).

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